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TOWARD A PROCESS-BASED APPROACH
TO FAILURE-TO-WARN LAW
MICHAEL S. JACOBS*
Over the last thirty years, failure-to-warn law has received
little scholarly attention. This lack of discussion most likely
stemmed from the courts' apparent ease in applying certain ele-
ments of negligence law to determine a manufacturer's liability
for failure to warn of risks associated with a product's use. Dur-
ing the last few years, however, commentators have begun to
scrutinize closely the apparent success of this branch of products
liability law. Closer analysis reveals that failure-to-warn law,
this seemingly well-behaved descendant of tort law, is actually a
problem child.
In this Article, Associate Professor Michael Jacobs examines
the fundamental flaws in the current status of failure-to-warn
law. Professor Jacobs finds that the existing rules governing fail-
ure-to-warn law are ambiguous, subjective and incapable of pre-
cise definition. Specifically, he argues that these definitional
problems prohibit courts from placing any meaningful limita-
tions on manufacturer liability, thereby imposing a duty of vir-
tual perfection on the manufacturer. Next, Professor Jacobs
critiques the recent works of two commentators which suggest
that the problems inherent in the failure-to-warn area may be
solved by a content-based approach. Professor Jacobs argues
that the commentators'focus on determining the "correct" con-
tent of particular warnings is misdirected and ineffective. In-
stead, he proposes that the courts adopt a process-based approach
to failure-to-warn law, focusing on the procedures used by manu-
facturers prior to adoption and publication of the warning label
to determine manufacturer liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the successful revolution in products liability law,' fail-
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity (1987); J.D., Yale Law School (1971); B.A., Dartmouth College (1968). The author
would like to thank Steven Siegel, John Roberts, Steve Teret, and Kirbie Knutson for their
many good suggestions and helpful advice; Dana Simaitis and David Sheikh for being the best
research assistants in the world; and the Faculty Research Fund of the DePaul University
College of Law for its generous support.
I. Prompted in part by the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960), to abolish the doctrine
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ure-to-warn doctrine has seemed the well-behaved child of the post-revo-
lutionary era. For the past thirty years, while courts and commentators
have wrestled with the serious theoretical and practical problems posed
by the two other components of modem products law, liability for defec-
tive manufacture2 and for defective design,3 failure-to-warn law has ap-
of privity of contract, the revolution replaced a regime centered on contractual undertakings
and the often obscure and usually detailed requirements of express and implied warranties
under the law of sales. See, e.g., McCabe v. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass. 177, 179-80, 112
N.E.2d 254, 256-57 (1953); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472-73, 139 N.E. 576,
577-78 (1923). The new regime's nature and practice largely resembled torts law. This mod-
em analysis subdivided the area into three distinct types of manufacturer responsibility: liabil-
ity for injuries caused by defectively made products (regardless of whether the defect could be
attributed to any negligence or fault on the part of the manufacturer); liability for injuries
caused by products well made but negligently designed; and liability for injuries caused by
products deemed defective because unaccompanied by a warning adequately describing the
relevant risks of product use or misuse. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1964) (outlining rules of strict liability for defectively made products); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILrrY LAW 1-118 (1980) (examining the development and
current status of manufacturer liability for defectively made products). For a contemporane-
ous and insightful discussion of the history and process of the revolution, see William L. Pros-
ser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-138 (1960) [hereinafter Assault];
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791,791-814 (1966) [hereinafter
Fall].
2. Courts and commentators first struggled with the question whether manufacturers
should be liable to bystanders for injuries caused by defectively made products, concluding
almost unanimously that they should. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d
578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 88-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1969); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort
Law-Tort Watch, 34 J. ASS'N TRIAL LAW. 1, 44-59 (1972) (tracing the development of case
law "emphatically in favor of the bystander"); Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Extension of
Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. Rv. 1, 4 (1970) ("Today ... there is a strong
current of judicial authority in favor of protection of foreseeable bystanders."). Courts and
commentators continue to grapple with the issue of whether manufacturers are liable for prop-
erty damage caused by inherent product defects and, if so, for what types of property damage.
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 867-68 (1986); Richard E.
Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More into the
Void, 67 B.U. L. Rv. 9, 11-27 (1987).
3. Over the past 20 years, courts have announced a number of different standards for
determining the existence of a design defect. Compare, e.g., Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764
F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring a "reasonably" safe design) and Height v. Kawasaki
Heavy Indus., 190 N.J. Super. 7, 10-11, 461 A.2d 757, 758 (1983) (same) with Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978)
(adopting in part the "consumer expectations" test) and id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 239 (adopting in part a "risk-utility" test) and O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169,
181-82, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983) (same).
Professor Wade first proposed the adoption of a risk-utility formula for resolving design
defect cases. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 834-35 (1973). His proposal identified seven separate factors as critical to the rational
application of risk-utility theory. Id. at 837-38. Professor Fischer subsequently advanced a
more extensive list of relevant factors. David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 359 (1974). Professor Shapo's theory offered 13 criteria for judg-
ing product defects. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protec-
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peared to function tolerably well without benefit of judicial adjustment or
academic influence.4
Perhaps failure-to-warn doctrine owed its apparent success to the
intuitive plausibility of its core assumption. The principle that manufac-
turers should act to reduce personal injuries by alerting consumers to the
relevant risks of product use doubtless struck a responsive chord with
almost all judges and academics, the vast majority of whom expressly
endorse injury prevention as one of the overriding objectives of the tort
system in general and of products liability law in particular.5
Perhaps the doctrine enjoyed a long season of immunity from criti-
cism because of the seeming ease with which courts could transpose upon
it many of the traditional principles and terms of tort law.6 In time-
tion: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rrv. 1109,
1370-71 (1974). Professors Montgomery and Owen suggested that many of the factors identi-
fied by others could usefully be compressed into a four-part test. John Montgomery & David
Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Prod-
ucts, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 818 (1976). Other tests emerged later. See, e.g., James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform,
56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 627-30 (1978); James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy
Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN.
L. REV. 773, 781 n.41 (1979); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability,
67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 464-71 (1979); Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal
Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575,
634 (1985); John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 566-71 (1980).
4. Immediately after the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 208, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982), that manufacturers could be liable
for failing to warn consumers about product hazards that were scientifically unknowable at the
time of the product's sale, commentators generated a spate of articles dealing with that hold-
ing. See Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications for Products Liability, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 733 (1983); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private
Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 534- 43 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability,
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 689-705 (1985). These articles constituted a small wave in an otherwise
calm sea.
5. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 5
(1987) ("There are two goals of modern tort law that all can agree upon: to reduce the acci-
dent rate as much as is practicable, and to provide a sensible and coherent system of compen-
sation insurance for those . . . who suffer product- or service-related accidents."). For a
judicial analogue, see, for example, McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338, 154
N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967) ("[I]n our view, enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured
by its products more adequately meets public policy demands to protect consumers from the
inevitable risks of bodily harm created by mass production and complex marketing
conditions.").
6. Professor Schwartz was the first to argue persuasively that, although characterized as
a form of "strict" liability, products liability based on warning defects was a form of negli-
gence. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 462-63; Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence
and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963, 972-73 (1981). Most courts have also
come to adopt the view that failure-to-warn doctrine sounds in negligence rather than in strict
1992]
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honored fashion, the methodology of failure-to-warn law focused, for ex-
ample, on the "foreseeability" of a particular product risk and the "ade-
quacy" of a particular warning label. Judicial reliance on these
traditional notions avoided the drastic departures from precedent occa-
sioned both by the application of strict liability rules to cases involving
manufacturing defects7 and by the use of complicated, multi-factor, risk-
utility tests for those involving design defects.8 By requiring manufactur-
ers to provide "reasonable" warnings about "relevant" risks to "average"
consumers,9 warnings doctrine couched its critical terms in the comforta-
ble language of negligence and resembled, at least for a while, a benign
and familiar theory, easy to understand and equally easy to apply.
In the past few years, however, as the controversies that plagued the
other aspects of products law have abated,10 the seemingly manageable
liability. Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985), contains a
representative statement of this view:
As an initial matter we question the commonly assumed and often asserted proposi-
tion that in products liability cases failure to warn or inadequacy of warning may be
a basis for imposition of strict liability. A review of the cases discloses that the analy-
sis called for in this situation is not based on strict liability, but negligence....
Just as liability for failure to warn of product risk is based on negligence, the
adequacy of a warning is also judged under a reasonableness standard ....
Id at 831-33, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 466; see also Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan.
279, 286, 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (1986) (holding that to impose liability on a manufacturer for
failure-to-warn, the plaintiff must show negligence on the part of the manufacturer), aff'd, 243
Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206 (1988).
7. For manufacturing defects, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964)
("Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer"). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court anticipated the Restatement with regard to strict liability for defects of
manufacture. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 170,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-99 (1964); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62,
150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). All other states have now followed its
lead. See, eg., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344-45, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-94, 525 P.2d
1033, 1035-36 (1974).
8. See discussion supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Laaperi v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 731 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986). The
first trace of a common-law duty to warn can be found in early Roman sales law, which obli-
gated vendors to disclose hidden product defects of which they actually knew. The strength of
this obligation was, no doubt, seriously diluted by the rule that required buyers to prove that
their sellers possessed the requisite knowledge of defect. J.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF Ro-
MAN LAW 286-89 (1976). The interplay between modern technology and later incarnations of
this early sales-based duty forms the larger background against which this aspect of the revolu-
tion in products liability law played itself out. See generally Assault, supra note 1, at 1099-1124
(describing the evolution of strict liability and its extension to consumer plaintiffs); Fall, supra
note 1, at 790-813 (continuing study of products liability's expansion begun in Assault).
10. For some impressive statistical indications of a recent reversal of the pro-plaintiff
trend which had apparently long characterized judicial decision-making in manufacturing and
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doctrine of failure-to-warn has become problematic. After more than
two decades of almost unbroken scholarly silence,1' in 1988 there ap-
peared a trickle of mild complaints lamenting the ease with which plain-
tiffs in failure-to-warn cases could successfully establish the necessary
elements of a prima facie case. 12 In the past years, two important works
have contended much more forcefully that serious flaws in failure-to-
warn law have caused the courts to be flooded with claims of faulty prod-
uct warnings, necessitating reconsideration of the manner in which
courts should apply that law. 3
Although strongly critical of warnings doctrine in practice, each of
these more recent works implicitly adopts the flawed assumption that
forms the philosophical foundation of the judicial opinions they criticize.
Each assumes that there exists a legally discoverable and correct content
for product warnings, and each advocates the retention of the content-
based approach historically employed by the judiciary to resolve failure-
to-warn claims. 4 Courts and juries, each work argues, should examine
closely the substance of particular warnings and properly distinguish the
"obvious" risks from the "hidden" ones, the "average" consumers from
the "atypical," and the "adequate" warning label formats from the "in-
design defect cases, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 481
(1990).
11. There were some notable breaks in the silence. See Aaron Gershonowitz, The Strict
Liability Duty to Warn, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 71 (1987); W. Page Keeton, Products Liabil-
ity-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REV. 398 (1970); John A. Kidwell, The Duty to
Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 Tax. L. Rav. 1375 (1975); M. Stuart Mad-
den, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221
(1987); Dix W. Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or
Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use
in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521 (1982); Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W.
Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication
Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 38 (1983); A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability: Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. RaV. 495 (1976)
[hereinafter Use and Abuse of Warnings]; James W. Torke, Note, Foreseeability In Product
Design and Duty To Warn Cases-Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228.
12. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 51-58 (1988); George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 217-20 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds.,
1988); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: 4 Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 398 (1988). As far back as 1980, Professor Epstein commented that the very
versatility of the failure-to-warn doctrine "is also the source of its potential dangers." EP-
STEIN, supra note 1, at 93.
13. 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 38-82 (1991) [hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE]; James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 267 (1990) [hereinafter Doctrinal Collapse].
14. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
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adequate."' 5 If they conduct the "right" kind of examination, using the
"correct" definitions and strictly applying the traditional limitations on
the abuse of doctrinal discretion, the institutional factfinders will dis-
cover the "correct" content for the warning in question, existing analyti-
cal problems will abate, the flood of claims 6 will recede, and the law will
function effectively. This Article argues that these commentators are
mistaken, not only about the nature and gravity of observed doctrinal
weaknesses, but more significantly about the type of approach best suited
to remedy them.
The flaws in the law of failure-to-warn are much more serious than
previously contemplated, so serious indeed that efforts to repair the doc-
trine along the content-oriented lines suggested by other commentators
will not only fail to cure the existing problems but will aggravate them.
The important limiting concepts upon which the doctrine relies so heav-
ily for its effective functioning are hollow constructs incapable of assum-
ing useful shape; certain critical terms in the doctrine's vocabulary are
hopelessly devoid of workable meaning. No proposal for reform pre-
mised on the substantive reconstruction of those empty concepts or the
attempted definition of those amorphous terms can possibly succeed.
The argument elaborated here proceeds from three related perspec-
tives: the descriptive, the prescriptive, and the normative. First, it de-
scribes the present state of failure-to-warn law, discussing its
fundamental flaws and demonstrating how they have thoroughly stymied
the hope of reasoned decision-making. Next, it examines the most recent
scholarly suggestions for solving some of the more pressing doctrinal dif-
ficulties and contends that all such suggestions, because they concentrate
largely on the specific content of particular warnings, are misdirected
and, for that reason, ineffectual. Finally, it proposes a procedural solu-
tion to the most grievous of the law's existing shortcomings, an approach
intended to harmonize the important informational and safety concerns
reflected in warnings theory with the practical impossibility of drafting a
product warning perfect in every respect. Arguably, this approach
would not only permit courts and juries to apply that body of law in a
fair and consistent fashion, but also would offer consumers the prospect
of more effective product safety information and would provide manufac-
15. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
16. For a detailed statistical analysis of the growth in all products liability claims brought
in federal court during the years 1977-1987, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product
Liability Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 150-52 (1991) ("[T]here is evidence at the federal
court level of a substantial increase in product liability litigation, both in absolute terms as well
as in relation to all civil litigation.").
[Vol. 71
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turers the possibility of producing helpful warning labels that are im-
mune from liability.
II. EXISTING FAILURE-TO-WARN LAW IS EFFECTIVELY DEVOID OF
MEANINGFUL STANDARDS
The conventional formulation of failure-to-warn law requires that a
manufacturer provide consumers with an adequate warning of the risks
associated with the use of its product.' 7 In this sense, warnings doctrine
resembles most other well-established legal dogma. It creates a set of
discrete obligations defined by a group of critical terms and bounded by
certain explicit limitations. Thus, although the untempered logic of the
doctrine's basic goal of injury prevention might compel a manufacturer
to give every consumer a perfectly drafted warning about every risk asso-
ciated with product use, the traditional expression of the doctrine modi-
fies that theoretically unbounded set of obligations in a number of
significant ways.
First, traditional doctrine relieves manufacturers of the duty to warn
about every risk. They need not describe risks that are either "obvi-
ous" 1 8 to the average consumer or so "remote" that their occurrence is
not reasonably foreseeable. 19 Second, failure-to-warn law does not re-
quire manufacturers to fashion product warnings that are ideal in every
way. It simply demands that those warnings be "adequate." 20 Finally,
conventional theory does not force manufacturers to anticipate the par-
ticular warning needs of every consumer, but permits them instead to
direct their product warnings to the attention of the average consumer.2'
17. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 20.
18. See, e.g., Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1989) (ap-
plying Louisiana law); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1414 (10th Cir. 1988) (ap-
plying Kansas law); Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying Indiana law); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716-19
(5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law); Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 731 (1st
Cir. 1986) (applying Massachusetts law); Smith v. Hub Mfg. Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1505, 1508
(N.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New York law).
19. See, e.g., Bish v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 236 F.2d 62, 69 (5th Cir. 1956)
(applying Louisiana law); Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909, 910 (4th Cir. 1955)
(applying Virginia law); Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 634-35 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (applying Pennsylvania law); American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181,
188 (Ind. 1983) (applying Indiana law).
20. See, e.g., Koonce, 798 F.2d at 716 (applying Texas law); Laaperi, 787 F.2d at 729
(applying Massachussetts law); Lust v. Clark Equip. Co., 792 F.2d 436, 438 (4th Cir. 1986)
(applying Virginia law); Nassif v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1422, 1424-25
(S.D. Iowa 1990) (applying Iowa law); Weinberger v. Bristol-Myers Co., 652 F. Supp. 187, 191
(D. Md. 1986) (applying Maryland law).
21. See, e.g., Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Laaperi, 787 F.2d at 731 n.3; Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct.
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The limiting rules pertaining to "obviousness," "remoteness," "ade-
quacy," and the "average consumer" theoretically seek to confine the
application of warnings law within bounds that are "reasonable."22 Re-
stricting the doctrine's scope in this manner would not only strike a use-
ful balance between the perfect and the possible, but would also protect
the judicial system from being overwhelmed by an endless flow of cases.
At the same time, a legal regime that imposed a set of effective but rea-
sonable requirements would establish for manufacturers a warning task
whose parameters are intellectually comprehensible and whose consistent
attainment is economically feasible. That, at least, is the theory behind
the limiting rules. In practice, however, none of those rules can work
because each is ambiguous, subjective, and incapable of reasoned
application.
A. The "Obvious Danger" Rule: Indeterminacy in Action
Most jurisdictions embrace the "obvious danger" rule23 in failure-
to-warn cases and require manufacturers to warn consumers about only
those product hazards considered hidden or latent. This rule draws sup-
port from a variety of sources,24 all of which share the seemingly plausi-
App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983); Vallillo v. Muskin Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 155,
159, 514 A.2d 528, 531 (1986).
22. Not only are these limitations generally or philosophically reasonable, but they appear
economically sensible as well. Thus, if one employs the calculus of economic rationality first
described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the probability [of injury] be called P; the [cost of the] injury L; and the
burden [in dollars of preventing the injury], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL."), it is arguably apparent that reasonable
warnings should not cover "obvious" or "remote" risks. In the case of the former, because
consumers can discover obvious risks as easily as the manufacturer, the probability is quite low
that any such risk will actually cause injury. Moreover, from the Calabresian perspective, a
consumer faced with an obvious risk of product-related harm may be able to devise a cheaper
and more efficient way of eliminating that risk than the manufacturer can suggest and may, for
that reason, be the better cost-avoider. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschof, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-61 (1972). In the case of remote risks,
although consumers cannot discern them, the manufacturers' costs of discovering and there-
fore preventing them are high, while the probability of injury is, by definition, low. These
conclusions are only "arguably" apparent because they depend for their strength entirely upon
the assumption that the terms "obvious" and "remote" can always, or almost always, be mean-
ingfully and usefully defined, an assumption that I consider heroic. See infra notes 27-40, 62-
70 and accompanying text.
23. See cases cited supra notes 18-21. Courts and commentators sometimes refer to the
obvious danger rule as the patent danger rule or as the obviousness rule.
24. Some courts rely upon a portion of comment j to § 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts which deals generally with a seller's duty to warn about the risks of its product in
order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous. The relevant portion of the
comment states that "a seller is not required to warn with respect to products... when the
danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized." REsrATEMENT (SEC-
[Vol. 71
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ble assumption that advising consumers about open and evident product
risks is unnecessary or redundant.2 5 Moreover, since space constraints
impose limits on the number of warnings that can fit on a particular
product, a rule compelling manufacturers to alert consumers to obvious
risks might force them to omit mention of other, more subtle risks,26 thus
weakening the overall efficacy of their warnings.
A minority of jurisdictions27 has rejected the obvious danger rule,
concluding that the obviousness of a particular risk does not by itself
relieve a manufacturer of the duty to warn of that risk. 8 According to
this view, obviousness constitutes but one of a number of factors that
manufacturers should consider in drafting "adequate" product warn-
ings.2 9 Since only four jurisdictions adhere to this view, one might expect
that the effective sphere of its influence would be narrow, its unusual
OND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1964). See, e.g., Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
451 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Other courts find the source of the obviousness limitation in comment k to § 388 of the
Restatement, which provides that "[ilt is not necessary for the supplier [of a product] to inform
those for whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over will
disclose." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. j (1964). See, e.g., Verna v.
United States Suzuki Motor Corp., 713 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1989), and cases cited
therein. Still others find their justification in the common-law notion that one need not warn
about that which another can plainly observe himself. See, e.g., Simpson v. Hurst Perform-
ance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445, 447 (M.D.N.C. 1977) aff'd without opinion, 588 F.2d 1351 (4th
Cir. 1978).
25. See, e.g., Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (Ist Cir. 1985) ("[I]f the law
required suppliers to warn of all obvious dangers inherent in a product, '[t]he list of foolish
practices warned against would be so long, it would fill a volume.' ") (quoting Kerr v. Koemm,
557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
26. But see Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App.) (specifi-
cally discussing "the problems of attempting to put multiple warnings on a hand drill of the
size and nature involved"), cert. denied, 440 So.2d 726 (La. 1983); see also Cotton v. Buckeye
Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (similar discussion regarding problems of
labeling products).
27. See Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying West
Virginia law); Horen v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 169 Mich. App. 725, 729-30, 426 N.W.2d 794, 796
(1988); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207-08, 485 A.2d 305, 309-311
(1984); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 536-37 (N.D. 1977).
28. The Olson court, for example, premised its rejection of the rule upon the "risk-spread-
ing concept of strict liability," which it viewed as burdening manufacturers with special legal
responsibilities. Olson, 256 N.W.2d at 537. The Horen and Campos courts both found nothing
conclusive in the obviousness of a particular risk, but regarded that factor simply as one part of
a multi-part test. Horen, 169 Mich. App. at 731, 426 N.W.2d at 796 (stating the test to be
"whether the risks are unreasonable in light of the foreseeable injuries"); Campos, 98 N.J. at
207, 485 A.2d at 309 (stating that obviousness of the risk is "one element to be factored into
the analysis"). The Harris court was vague about its rationale, incorrectly announcing at one
point that the obvious danger doctrine is "seldom used" and stating at another that the doc-
trine is inconsistent with the "foreseeability concept." Harris, 640 F.2d at 76.
29. See Horen, 169 Mich. App. at 731, 426 N.W.2d at 797; Campos, 98 N.J. at 209, 485
A.2d at 311.
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perspective a matter of occasional intellectual curiosity but limited prac-
tical significance. It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the
probable impact of this particular minority rule, despite the small
number of its adherents and whatever theoretical weaknesses might char-
acterize the rationales advanced on its behalf. The four minority juris-
dictions (Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia, and North Dakota) are
geographically dispersed, and a manufacturer cannot effectively isolate
them from its other markets. Therefore, the manufacturer must inevita-
bly face the risk that some products will find their way into one or more
of these jurisdictions, where they will be confronted with a stricter set of
warning requirements which cannot safely be ignored. For this reason,
even manufacturers doing business exclusively in the so-called majority
states must conform their warnings to the minority rule or potentially
expose themselves to liability. Thus, as a practical matter, the facts of
commercial life extend the minority rule into all jurisdictions and compel
every manufacturer to consider obvious risks in its warning label
calculus.3 0  Whatever benefits the obvious danger rule might confer in
the "majority" states that have adopted it are thus likely to be seriously
diluted, if not effectively eliminated, by the pervasive influence of this
particular minority view.
The universal adoption of the majority position would not, however,
cure the problems of the obvious danger rule. Instead, it would serve, as
it has in majority jurisdictions, simply to dramatize the hopeless subjec-
tivity of that rule and to reveal its utter inability to perform its theoretical
limiting function. The majority rule, made uniform, would still suffer
from incurable indeterminacy and would continue to germinate a confus-
ing and irrational assortment of judicial opinions.
Consider, for example, two relatively familiar products: an alco-
holic beverage and an above-ground swimming pool. Each presents the
average consumer with an array of potential hazards, many of which are
seemingly well known: the beverage intoxicates users in a way that
might adversely affect their judgment and harm their health; the swim-
ming pool sits on a hard surface, forceful contact with which can cause
serious injury. Arguably, these risks should constitute a baseline for the
obvious danger rule, the lowest common denominator of its application.
In practice, however, when it comes to defining obvious dangers, courts
have been unable to agree on a common denominator because their vari-
ous notions of obviousness have so little in common.
30. My own admittedly anecdotal experience supports this thesis. Along with the hot air
corn popper that I recently received came a written warning from the manufacturer telling me:
"Do not touch the corn popper when it is hot." THE WEST BEND CO., CARE AND USE IN-
STRUCTIONS: HOT AIR CORN POPPER 1 (1990).
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Even within jurisdictions, different courts disagree about the obvi-
ousness of similar risks. In Texas, for example, that state's supreme
court held recently that manufacturers of "beverage alcohol" need not
warn consumers about the addictive nature of their product, because that
danger should be apparent to a reasonable user.3 ' Only three years ago,
by contrast, a Texas appellate court held that a maker of tequila had a
duty to caution consumers that drinking large amounts of its product in
a short time could cause death, 32 a prospect deemed not obvious as a
matter of law. Courts dealing with above-ground swimming pools gener-
ally fare no better. Most refuse to require manufacturers to warn swim-
mers about the risks of diving into the pool's shallow end; 33 others
declare that manufacturers must tell divers,34 bellyfloppers,35 and users
of inner tubes36 about the hazards posed by forceful bodily contact with
the hard bottom of the shallow end of the pool.
37
These cases are merely illustrative. The world of failure-to-warn is
replete with comparable oddities.3" What this sideshow of strange cases
31. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (rex. 1991).
32. Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (rex. Ct. App. 1988). Some
argue that McGuire implicitly overrules Brune and demonstrates, finally but definitively, that
the Texas jurists have at last recognized the obvious. For example, Professors Henderson and
Twerski rejoiced in print over McGuire and heralded its announcement as proof that courts
could reach "correct" decisions about the obviousness issue. See Some Obvious Truths About
Obvious Danger Warnings, 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 877, 877 (August 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Obvious Danger Warnings]. But a closer look at the genesis of that decision is
revealing. The Texas appellate court that decided McGuire ruled unanimously that the risk of
alcohol addiction was not obvious and did require a warning. See McGuire v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 851 (rex. Ct. App. 1990). Although the Texas Supreme
Court took the opposite view, the clearest lesson taught by McGuire is that, for purposes of
failure-to-warn law, "obviousness" depends not upon logic, nor upon common sense, nor even
upon anything articulable, but rather upon which group of jurists has the final word.
33. See, eg., Colosimo v. May Dep't Store Co., 466 F.2d 1234, 1235 (3d Cir. 1972); Mc-
Cormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Vallillo v. Mus-
kin Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 155, 163, 514 A.2d 528, 532 (1986); Belling v. Haugh's Pools, Ltd.,
126 A.D.2d 958, 959, 511 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 602,
512 N.E.2d 550 (1987); Benjamin v. Deftet Rentals, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 86, 89, 419 N.E.2d
883, 886 (1981).
34. Glittenberg v. Wilcenski, 174 Mich. App. 321, 326, 435 N.W.2d 480, 482, aff'd, 436
Mich. 673, 462 N.W.2d 348 (1990), reconsideration granted, 437 Mich. 1224, 464 N.W.2d 710
(1991).
35. Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. Erickson v. Muskin Corp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 117, 126, 535 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1989).
37. Even in Michigan, one of the few states to reject the obvious danger rule, see supra
text accompanying note 29, the court of appeals, in a case brought by a 17-year-old plaintiff
who had "taken swimming and diving instructions in high school, including a life saving
class," found that the risk of diving into shallow water was not open and obvious, because "the
risk of serious injury, in this case paraplegia, is not obvious in the absence of some form of
warning." Glittenburg, 174 Mich. App. at 326, 435 N.W.2d at 481-82.
38. For example, in Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1985), the plain-
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serves strikingly to dramatize is that those courts embracing the obvious
danger rule have interpreted it inconsistently, without offering any doc-
trinally coherent explanation of their views. To the extent that some
courts continue to confront directly the problem of distinguishing the
"obvious" from the "hidden" risk, it is glaringly apparent that none has
articulated a well-reasoned basis for differentiating those terms. As a re-
sult, courts have effectively announced that while there might theoreti-
cally exist a risk so obvious that manufacturers need not warn about it, as
a practical matter they can neither define nor describe that kind of risk.
Consequently, they have virtually stripped the obvious danger rule of its
limiting function, destroying in practice the boundaries supposed by the-
ory to confine the kinds of risks about which manufacturers must warn.
Though certainly distressing from the perspective of philosophical
integrity, from other perspectives the breakdown of the obvious danger
rule is not all that startling. "Obviousness" defies objective definition.39
tiff's 16-month-old son sustained severe injuries when he choked while eating Peter Pan
Creamy Peanut Butter, a product made by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the pea-
nut butter was unsafe because it lacked a warning that it should not be fed to children under
four years of age. Id. at 712. In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court held that the risk that a 16-month old might choke on peanut butter was not obvious as a
matter of law and that a jury should therefore determine whether the defendant should have
warned about that risk. Id. at 714.
The National Law Journal recently reported that a teenage girl filed suit in August 1991
against Nintendo Company and Toys "R" Us, seeking damages for injuries to her wrist that
she allegedly incurred by playing Nintendo home video games, and claiming that Nintendo
had failed to warn buyers of the physical risks attendant upon the use of its products. See Not
Work-Related, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2, 1991, at 6.
39. In this sense, failure-to-warn law unwittingly serves as a dramatic case study of the
theories of critical linguistic scholars. According to these scholars, and to legal realists as well,
language in general, and particularly legal language, has no real or fixed meaning. See gener-
ally ROBERT M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLICS (1975) (the seminal statement of the
critical legal view); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935) (the classic account of the realist position). James Boyle, who has
artfully described the gradual assimilation by critical legal thought of the "post-Wittgen-
steinian view of language," summarizes that view as follows:
(1) Words do not have "essences."
(2) Words do not have "core meanings."
(3) Language is, or can be, used in an infinite number of ways: it is a malleable
instrument of communication.
(4) That a word is most commonly used to mean
X does not mean that X is the "core" or "plain" or "essential" meaning of that
word. To look to the "plain meaning" of a word as its "real meaning" is a
special type of reification, since it ignores the purpose for which the word is
actually being used.
James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 685, 708-09 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1067 (1985) (describing the courts'
failures to examine the consideration doctrine from a purely objective perspective due to the
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Webster's New World Dictionary, for example, defines the word "obvi-
ous" as "easy to see or understand,"'' but says nothing about the partic-
ular circumstances or people whose characteristics might bear on the
ease with which something can be seen or understood. As with
"beauty," any understanding of "obvious" must be strictly personal and
subject completely to the perspective of the beholder.
The judiciary has demonstrated, much better than semiotic theory
ever could, that the word "obvious," by itself and detached from life's
contingencies, is inherently ambiguous and utterly subjective, incapable
of a more precise definition than Webster's. Thus, to some courts, an
obvious product risk is one that is "apparent"; a' to others, the obvi-
ousness of a risk depends upon the plaintiff's "familiarity" with defend-
ant's product;42 and to others still, obviousness relates to the "essence" of
the product.43 In a manner strangely reminiscent of the French doctor
made famous in Felix Cohen's classic simile, every court has fallen un-
avoidably into the tautological trap of defining an obvious risk as one
that is reasonably obvious,' a failing foreordained, if not by the indeter-
minacy of all language,45 then at least by the insubstantiality of the word
"obvious" in this particular context.
necessarily subjective inquiry into the meaning of "intent of parties"); Gerald E. Frug, The
Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276, 1287 (1984) (discussing
the lack of separate, distinct meaning between the words "subjective" and "objective" and
their use in describing the bureaucratic structure in American law); Thomas C. Heller, Struc-
turalism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv. 127, 133-40 (1984) (discussing structuralism and its
role in critical legal theory); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Consti-
tutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 683, 685, 700 (1985) (arguing that constitutional textualism
fails as a valid theory because it authorizes judges to interpret the law's requirements as "any-
thing from laissez faire to socialism"). A partial bibliography of the literature dealing with
modem semantic theory is contained in Boyle's article, supra, at 708-09 nn.77-78.
40. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 937 (Victoria
Neufeldt et a. eds., 3d college ed. 1988).
41. Simpson v. Hurst Performance, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 445, 447 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd
without opinion, 588 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Holocek v. E-Z Just, 124 Ill. App. 3d
251, 256, 464 N.E.2d 696, 699 (1984) ("readily apparent and well-known").
42. See, eg., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 562, 667 P.2d 750, 756 (Ct.
App. 1983) ("Surely every adult knows that if an electrical extension cord is cut or frayed a
danger of electrical shock is created."); Kokoyachuk v. Aeroquip Corp., 172 Ill. App. 3d 432,
439, 526 N.E.2d 607, 611 (1988) ("[T]he plaintiff was familiar with the allegedly dangerous
propensity of the trailer.").
43. Shaffer v. AMF, Inc., 842 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The motorcycle's combina-
tion of the thrill of the open passenger compartment and the response of the powerful engine in
a lightweight frame,... is the essence of the motorcycle's dangers.").
44. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 820 ("Legal arguments couched in these terms are neces-
sarily circular,... and such arguments add precisely as much to our knowledge as Moliere's
physician's discovery that opium puts men to sleep because it contains a dormitive principle.").
45. See supra note 39.
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Some commentators think otherwise. In a recent article, 46 for ex-
ample, Professors Henderson and Twerski discuss the obvious danger
rule at length, referring to it as the rule which, "[p]erhaps more than any
other aspect of warnings doctrine... should help courts cull unworthy
failure-to-warn claims from the worthy."'4 7 Henderson and Twerski ar-
gue that the obvious danger rule not only could, but would, serve this
salutary purpose, if only courts were to heed their criticisms and adopt
some simple suggestions. They contend implicitly that the obviousness of
a particular risk is measurable and should be, in each case, a relative
matter, dependent upon the particular plaintiff and "the class of users
and consumers of which [he] ... is a member. '48 They criticize courts
for making "the largest single error" respecting obviousness, the error of
sending too many cases to the jury on weak facts.49 As an antidote, they
urge courts to raise the standard of obviousness and to interpret the obvi-
ous danger rule more robustly.50
These criticisms seem valid, at least superficially. Their accompany-
ing suggestions have a logical and useful ring to them. Courts should
define obviousness correctly and try harder to keep weak cases from the
jury. If they do, great progress will follow, and the faltering doctrine of
failure-to-warn will at last find itself firmly on solid ground. Sadly, how-
ever, for simplicity's sake, the validity of the Henderson-Twerski criti-
cisms, the utility of their suggestions, and the value of their approach all
depend entirely upon the heroic assumption that courts can logically ar-
rive at a shared understanding of what constitutes an obvious risk. If
that assumption collapses under the weight of fact, if no amount of "ro-
bust" effort can lead courts to the one, true definition of obviousness, if
courts are compelled by the indeterminacy of the concept to fashion a
hodgepodge of mutually inconsistent views, then proposals like those of
Professors Henderson and Twerski, though appealing in the abstract,
will not work in practice.
If anything is obvious about the obvious danger rule, it is that courts
cannot agree on the definition of an "obvious" risk. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc. v. McGuire5" provides an instructive example of this phe-
46. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 265.
47. Id. at 280.
48. Idt at 285.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 317. Henderson and Twerski also argue that the obvious danger rule makes
such good sense that those few courts which have thus far rejected it should change course,
accept the rule, and apply it uniformly and without exception. Id. at 280-82.
51. 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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nomenon. Plaintiffs52 in McGuire alleged that they suffered from alco-
holism caused by their consumption of beverages manufactured and sold
by Seagram and another defendant, 3 and that those beverages were de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous because they were distributed with-
out a warning of the addictive nature of beverage alcohol.54 Seagram
moved at trial to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that "the effects
of beverage alcohol are commonly known" and that it had no duty to
warn the consumer about common knowledge.55 The trial court granted
Seagram's motion.56 The court of appeals reversed, and the Texas
Supreme Court reversed again, reinstating the original order of dismissal,
on the ground that Seagram had no duty to warn since these were obvi-
ous risks.57
Professors Henderson and Twerski applauded the final decision in
McGuire.5" To them, it represented a perfect example of their theories at
work; like several other appellate courts,59 the Texas Supreme Court
properly recognized the obvious risks attendant upon the prolonged or
excessive consumption of alcohol, correctly decided that the manufac-
turer need not warn about them, and appropriately removed the case
from the system before it could get to the jury.'
McGuire, however, refutes rather than supports the Henderson-
Twerski thesis and demonstrates dramatically why a legal doctrine de-
pendent upon characterizing particular risks as "obvious" or "hidden" is
destined to fail. While the justices of the Texas Supreme Court saw the
product risks in McGuire as obvious, at least two of the appellate court
judges did not.61 Though the supreme court's decision in vcGuire ac-
52. There were several plaintiffs in McGuire; three separate actions had been consolidated
for appeal. See McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (1991).
53. Id. The other named defendant was Hiram Walker Inc.
54. Id. at 846.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 853.
57. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991).
58. See Obvious Danger Warnings, supra note 32, at 877. Professors Henderson and
Twerski helped to prepare an amicus brief urging reversal of the appellate court's decision. Id.
59. See Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982); Maguire v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Iowa 1986); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits
Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984).
60. Obvious Danger Warnings, supra note 32, at 881.
61. Chief Justice Walker wrote a separate concurrence agreeing that "these cases in all
things be reversed." McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 854 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990) (Walker, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (1991). In 1988, a different
panel of the Texas Court of Appeals split, two to one, over the issue of whether the maker of
Miller Lite beer should have warned consumers about the dangers of driving an automobile
after excessive beer consumption and instructed them on the safe use of its prcduct. While the
1992]
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cords with those of most other appeals courts that have considered the
issue,62 it conflicts with others.63 In Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.," for ex-
ample, the Third Circuit rejected the obvious danger defense and ac-
cepted plaintiff's claim that a warning may have been required on
defendant's beer cans because it was not common knowledge that "either
excessive or prolonged, even though moderate, use of alcohol may result
in diseases of many kinds."6
If, as Henderson and Twerski contend, obvious risks are simply
waiting there for courts to recognize, then what accounts for the sharp
disagreement between the appeals court judges and the supreme court
justices in McGuire? What explains the drastically dissimilar views of
the Third and Seventh Circuits, for instance, about the obviousness of the
risks of prolonged or excessive consumption of alcohol?66 Moreover,
what justifies the pervasive and continuing inability of the judiciary to
define "obviousness" in objective terms?67 Henderson and Twerski de-
scribe as "absurd" a number of cases involving "patently obvious dan-
gers" that courts have nevertheless refused to dismiss.6 8 They inform us
majority held that the risks were obvious and the instruction unnecessary, Chief Justice Evans
argued in dissent that plaintiff should have been allowed to take to the jury her allegation that
Miller "could have issued safety instructions to its consumers about how much Miller Lite
Beer a person could safely consume before becoming too inebriated to drive." Malek v. Miller
Brewing Co., 749 S.W.2d 521, 525 (rex. Ct. App. 1988) (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
62. See cases cited supra note 59.
63. McGuire conflicts not only with Hon, discussed infra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text, but interestingly enough also with Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827 (rex.
Ct. App. 1988), where a different panel of the Texas Court of Appeals held that a complaint,
alleging that tequila was not safe for its intended use without instructions describing how to
use it safely, raised a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 831.
64. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 511. Professors Henderson and Twerski dismiss Hon as irrelevant to the "core
risks at the heart of the obvious danger rule," contending that it involved only a claim that
consumers were unaware "of the risks arising from non-excessive drinking." See Obvious Dan-
ger Warnings, supra note 32, at 881. The passage from Hon quoted in the text, however, casts
some doubt on that contention. More significantly, even if the issue in Hon is properly de-
scribed as whether a manufacturer of alcohol must warn consumers about the risks of pro-
longed but moderate alcohol use, the likelihood that courts and juries will agree unanimously
about the obviousness of those risks seems slim.
66. Compare Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982) (warning not
required about the harmful "propensities" of alcohol because "the dangers of the use of alco-
hol are common knowledge to such an extent that the product cannot objectively be consid-
ered to be unreasonably dangerous") with Hon, 835 F.2d at 511 (finding no such common
knowledge). The danger of addiction to alcoholic beverages, however, which may not be so
well-known, might necessitate a specific warning, even in those jurisdictions that have charac-
terized the behavior-altering quality of alcohol as common knowledge. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1989) (discuss-
ing the lack of warnings regarding the addictions that may result from drug and alcohol use).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
68. See cases collected in Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 317 nn.208-12.
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that these cases "are not isolated examples" and that the reporters
"abound with them."6 9 They fail to recognize, however, that these large
numbers of what they call "absurd" results follow inevitably from the
inherent impossibility of uniformly applying an obvious danger rule, the
features of which are hopelessly indistinct.
Courts and commentators are certainly not to blame for having
failed to recognize or develop a universally acceptable definition of "obvi-
ousness." Rather, it seems clear that no acceptable definition can possi-
bly exist. In specific cases reasonable judges will always disagree, easily
and rationally, about the application of the obvious danger rule to partic-
ular risks; 70 honest but differing notions of semantics, common sense,
and intuition will inevitably lead courts and commentators alike into
these kinds of disagreements. Obviousness is either an empty concept or
an indeterminate one, but in no event can it help to resolve any but the
simplest of failure-to-warn cases. The obvious danger rule simply does
not work.
B. The Remote Danger Rule
If the obvious danger rule is theoretically supposed to stabilize one
end of warnings doctrine, then the remote danger rule is meant to anchor
the other.71 Traditionally, the remote danger rule excuses the manufac-
turer from any duty "to warn of a risk that is remotely possible to the
unknown few in the population."72 As the apparent complement to its
69. Id. at 317.
70. Problems of semantic subjectivity are not, of course, unique to failure-to-warn law.
Discussing the provision of § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that defines "abnor-
mally dangerous activities" partly in terms of the social value of the particular activity, the
Supreme Court of Oregon observed:
There are at least two reasons not to judge civil liability for unintended harm by
a court's views of the utility or value of the harmful activity. One reason lies in the
nature of the judgment. Utility and value are often subjective and controversial.
They will be judged differently by those who profit from an activity and those who
are endangered by it, and between one locality and another .... Judges, like others,
may differ about such values; they can hardly be described as conclusions of law.
Koos v. Roth, 293 Or. 670, 679, 652 P.2d 1255, 1261 (1982).
71. This is neither a logically nor a linguistically symmetrical phenomenon. "Remote"
and "obvious" are not antonyms. The opposite of remote is "near" or "likely," while the
opposite of "obvious" is "hidden." Remoteness, moreover, is a probabilistic notion, while
"obviousness" is not.
72. Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Pres-
brey v. Gillette Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1092, 435 N.E.2d 513, 520 (1982)); see also Elsroth
v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 165-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that warning that
drugs are susceptible to tampering is not necessary); Morrison v. Grand Forks Hous. Auth.,
436 N.W.2d 221, 228-29 (N.D. 1989) (holding that warning that smoke detector will not oper-
ate without batteries is not necessary).
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obviousness counterpart, the remote danger rule serves an analogous lim-
iting purpose, attempting to keep from the jury a second category of
cases involving risks for which warnings are thought unnecessary, and
thus to restrict the world of actionable warnings cases to those involving
risks hidden from the consumer but reasonably foreseeable to the pru-
dent manufacturer.
In application, unfortunately, the remote danger rule does very little
to circumscribe failure-to-warn doctrine. The definitional problems that
plague judicial efforts to give precise and broadly applicable meaning to
the term "remote ' 7 3 seem almost as acute as those attendant upon at-
tempts to develop a working definition of "obvious."'74 This difficulty
exists largely because the remote danger rule is probabilistic in nature; in
order to apply it effectively, courts must complete two essentially impos-
sible tasks. They must first either locate or compile valid statistical meas-
ures that accurately describe the frequency with which a particular risk
will cause harm. Second, they must translate those measures into a rela-
tively precise and generally acceptable legal notion of remoteness.75
Courts have thus far made almost no progress toward accomplish-
ing either of those tasks. For most products, no risk-based statistics ex-
ist. For this reason, except in cases involving adverse reactions to
pharmaceutical or chemical products,76 judicial opinions discussing the
73. Webster's Dictionary defines "remote" as: "1. [D]istant in space or time; ... [2]
[D]istant in connection, relation . . .; [3] [s]light; [a remote chance]." WEBSTER'S Naw
WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, supra note 40, at 1135.
74. Professors Henderson and Twerski, for example, note that "the remoteness of the
perceived risk will rarely provide the court in a failure-to-warn case with an independent
means of taking the plaintiff's claim from the jury;" they claim that courts apply the obvious
danger rule to limit manufacturer liability much more often than they use the remoteness rule
for that end. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 294.
75. Ideally, product warnings would accomplish two related ends: They would not only
inform consumers of the frequency of a particular risk, but would also alert them to the prob-
able severity of harm associated with the occurrence of that risk. See Schwartz, supra note 12,
at 396. To resolve the remoteness question with the proper degree of precision, courts must be
able to decide rationally and with some degree of uniformity that, for example, a risk of death
(or serious personal injury, or injury of any kind) is legally remote with respect to product x
(or with respect to all products, or to only those products that are of the same "type" as
product x) at the probability level of, say, one in a million.
76. In the pharmaceutical field, manufacturer-supplied data allowed a number of courts
to apply the remote danger rule in an apparently rational fashion in cases involving claims of
failure-to-warn for allergic or adverse drug reactions. See, eg., Blalock v. Westwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 89-2117, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 974, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 1990)
(one million units of sunscreen sold; one complaint); Lemoine v. Aero-Mist, Inc., 539 So. 2d
712, 714 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing expert physician testimony that chemicals in insecticide
caused allergic reaction in only one of 30,000 allergic patients examined by him); Booker v.
Revlon Realistic Professional Prods., Inc., 433 So. 2d 407, 410 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (seven
million potential users; four complaints received); Rhodes v. Max Factor, Inc., 264 So. 2d 263,
267 n.7 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (1.25 million units sold; 65 complaints); Thomas v. Gillette Co.,
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remoteness of a particular risk rarely refer to any data whatsoever,77 but
rely instead upon anecdotal evidence and intuition.78 In only a small
minority of cases do courts expressly rely on statistical measures of
probability,79 and in many of those cases the validity and objectivity of
the statistical measures are questionable.80 In those few cases where they
do possess "good" data, courts sometimes require manufacturers to warn
about risks that pose a statistically insignificant possibility of injury,
without advancing a logical rationale for such a requirement.81 More-
over, since courts rarely have any useful data at their disposal, they nec-
essarily treat the concept of remoteness in vague and idiosyncratic ways,
occasionally making the duty to warn a function not just of foreseeability
230 So. 2d 870, 873 (La. Ct. App.) (one million units sold; two complaints received), writ
refused, 255 La. 809, 233 So. 2d 249 (1970). Even these cases, however, are not completely
satisfying from a doctrinal perspective. For one thing, in almost all of these cases the data
available to the court were compiled by the manufacturer-defendant itself, pursuant to a pro-
cess subject to its exclusive control that relied entirely on self-reporting by injured consumers.
For another, while the one-in-a-million risk may intuitively seem legally "remote," intuition
might distinguish, and perhaps the law should as well, between that risk and the 65-in-
1,250,000 risk.
77. See, e.g., Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (char-
acterizing drug tampering as a remote danger because it stems from "isolated incidents of...
crazed behavior").
78. In this context, a court's intuitive understanding about the remoteness of a particular
risk must necessarily be deeply influenced by the fact that the risk in question has materialized
and caused serious harm to the plaintiff before it. Thus, the formation of judicial intuition
inevitably begins with the judge's personal knowledge that the arguably "remote" risk has
resulted in a case of actual harm.
79. See cases cited supra note 72.
80. In all of the pharmaceutical and chemical products cases collected at supra note 76,
both components of the probability data used by the courts were generated exclusively by the
manufacturer-defendants. The manufacturer's figures on sales constitute the denominator of
the probability fraction; its figures on product-related injuries comprise the numerator. More-
over, the fact that the numerator represents only those injuries reported by consumers to the
manufacturer, and not all injuries, casts further doubt on the validity of the kind of data cus-
tomarily used in those cases.
81. Recently, for example, in Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 59 Wash.
App. 287, 797 P.2d 527, aff'd, 11 Wash. 2d 747, 818 P.2d 133 (1990), a Washington State
appellate court reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $2,500,000, holding
in the process that the defendant, the manufacturer of its own brand of baby oil, should have
placed a warning on its product alerting buyers to the risks posed by aspiration of the bottle's
contents. Id. at 296, 797 P.2d at 533. Given that from 1932 to 1985, the year of the injury at
issue, "Johnson & Johnson had sold over 500 million bottles of baby oil without a single report
of aspiration," the dissent regarded the risk of aspiration as "exceedingly remote." Id. at 297-
98, 797 P.2d at 533 (Reed, J., dissenting). The applicable warnings provision of the Washing-
ton Products Liability Act seemed specifically to make foreseeability one of the legally relevant
criteria in failure-to-warn cases by directing courts to consider "the likelihood that the product
would cause [plaintiff's] harm." WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(l)(b) (West 1992). The
majority, however, paid no heed either to the statistical information or to the apparent foresee-
ability requirement, declaring that in failure-to-warn actions the foreseeability of injury is not
an element of the claim. Ayers, 59 Wash. App. at 295, 797 P.2d at 531.
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of harm but of severity of harm as well.82 Without objective and empiri-
cal measures of probability, courts thus are condemned to apply the re-
mote danger rule in the same vague and confusing fashion that
characterizes their application of the obvious danger standard.83
The remote danger rule poses other significant practical problems.
First, because judges see plaintiffs actually injured by the realization of
arguably "remote" risks, many might be inclined to feel sympathy for the
casualties of such risks, to conclude that the addition of one more simple
sentence to the defendant's warning label would have prevented the
plaintiff's injury, and to find on that basis that the defendant's product
should have contained a more complete warning. 4 The application of
this judicial philosophy leads inexorably to the piecemeal and uncon-
trolled expansion of the content of warning labels, without any broad
consideration first being given to the problems of informational over-
load"5 and consumer confusion 6 that may attend overly elaborate warn-
ing messages.
82. See, eg., Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1961)
("[W]hen injury is likely to be serious... even slight foreseeability may warrant... a conclu-
sion.., that prudence requires the manufacturer to take on [the] small added burden" to
warn.).
83. See Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1988) (warning unnecessary
where plaintiff's harm "not reasonably foreseeable" or risk is "remotely possible to the un-
known few in the population").
84. See Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 293-94. These criticisms are certainly valid,
but they seem secondary to what one should consider the main problem: the extreme difficulty
of providing the concept of "remoteness" with sufficient statistical or semantic clarity to enable
courts to decide like cases in a like manner and to inform manufacturers in advance of trial of
those risks that must be described in their warning labels.
85. The scientific literature describes information overload as a process of informational
exchange which, by providing large amounts of information to consumers, results in their
making objectively poorer decisions. See James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in
Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. MARKETING & PUB. POL'Y 1,
7 (1986); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CON-
SUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982). Bettman, Payne, and Staelin state that because of the overload
phenomenon, "an important issue in the design of product labels is to present sufficient infor-
mation for informed choices without presenting so much information that consumers will pro-
cess it selectively, possibly leading to suboptimal choices." Id. The empirical evidence
supporting the overload hypothesis is equivocal, and the validity of the hypothesis itself is the
subject of much debate in the scientific and legal literature. See infra note 91 and accompany-
ing text.
86. Professors Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, and Piehler were the first legal scholars to
argue that the continual addition of risk information to product warning labels might entail
costs unanticipated by courts employing a risk-utility balancing test. In particular, they ar-
gued that warnings
must call the consumer's attention to a danger that has a real probability of occurring
and whose impact will be significant .... The warning process, in order to have
impact, will have to select carefully the items which are to become part of the con-
sumer's mental apparatus while using the product. Making the consumer account
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Finally, a distinct minority of courts refuses to accept the basic prin-
ciple that manufacturers need not warn about remote risks. For these
courts, no risk is too improbable to excuse a manufacturer's failure to
warn of it, even a risk unknowable to the manufacturer at the time that
its product is sold.8 7 Judicial adherents of this extreme approach have
expanded the manufacturer's duty to warn so dramatically as to alter the
nature of the relevant legal inquiry. In states that reject the remoteness
rule, a product warning "perfect" in all reasonable respects could never-
theless become the basis for manufacturer liability should a consumer
injury eventuate from a product hazard that was not only unforeseeable
to the manufacturer but was neither known by, nor knowable to, anyone
in the world.8" Critics of this approach have correctly condemned it as
both unfair and inefficient.8 9 But it stands there, nevertheless, at one of
the far ends of failure-to-warn doctrine, imposing upon manufacturers
requirements that cannot possibly be met.
mentally for trivia or guard against risks that are not likely to occur imposes a very
real societal cost.
Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 11, at 514-15.
87. Following the lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-08, 447 A.2d 539, 546-47 (1982), which rejected the "state of
the art" defense in products liability cases, a number of other courts adopted a strict liability
standard for scientifically unknowable risks. See, e.g., Kisor v. Johns Manville Corp., 783 F.2d
1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington law and holding that manufacturer's igno-
rance of risks will not alleviate liability); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233,
236 (D. Haw. 1988) (applying Hawaii law and rejecting "state-of-the-art evidence" as a de-
fense in failure-to-warn cases); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 413, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277
(1984) (attributing knowledge of product risks to vendor regardless of his actual knowledge of
those dangers); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (holding that
manufacturer's standard of care is irrelevant); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 346 Pa. Super.
95, 104, 499 A.2d 326, 331 (1985) (holding manufacturer liable for all risks regardless of
knowledge). Two years after its decision in Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited
the rule announced in Beshada to asbestos cases only, declaring for other types of cases a rule
that requires that defendants prove that the risk information in question "was not reasonably
available or obtainable and that [they] therefore lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the
defect." Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 N.J. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984). The other
jurisdictions that followed New Jersey's lead in Beshada have not joined in its subsequent
partial retreat from the strict liability rule formulated in that case.
88. Like the minority position on the obvious danger rule, see supra notes 27-29 and ac-
companying text, the minority view of remote risks is likely to have a disproportionately broad
practical influence.
89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at
273-75. The difficulties of insuring oneself efficiently against the occurrence of an unknowable
risk are larger than, but not too different from, those created by the remote danger rule's
requirement that a manufacturer explore all conceivable possibilities of harm in order to deter-
mine which, if any, should be described in its warning. The problem of deciding on the effi-
cient amount to invest in discovering the boundaries of remote risk appears almost as acute as
the problem of knowing how much to invest in attempting to find the unknowable.
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C. Judicial Alternatives to Traditional Doctrine: Right Question,
Wrong Answer
Most courts fail even to acknowledge the doctrinal dead-end result-
ing from the disintegration of the obvious and remote danger rules and
the consequent irresistible movement toward a warning requirement fully
comprehensive as to risk. Two courts, however, have expressly recog-
nized smaller problems within this larger dilemma and have sought to
address them directly.90 These courts have realized that a legal obliga-
tion to warn about virtually every risk cannot be translated pragmatically
into a regime of completely comprehensive warning labels. For many
products, the relatively small size of the product itself effectively limits
the physical space available for warning information. For those prod-
ucts, courts have acknowledged that practical wisdom might dictate
warning labels that are less than exhaustive, since many consumers either
might be incapable of understanding and remembering extensive infor-
mation about risk or might be inhibited from reading a cluttered or com-
plicated warning label.91
90. See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Broussard
v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La.
1983); see also Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that, if a
manufacturer warns of all dangers associated with a product, "[t]he list of foolish practices
would be so long it would fill a volume"); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 695, 701, 677
P.2d 1147, 1153 (1984) (recognizing that requiring manufacturers to warn of every possible
danger "dilut[es] the force of any specific warning given"); Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 364
So. 2d 1243, 1244-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that "[t]o hold that every part subject
to repair at grave risk must have a warning would result in an impossible and even undesirable
situation"), rev'd on other grounds, 380 So. 2d 1035 (1980); Dunn, 121 Mich. App. 73, 81-83,
328 N.W.2d 576, 580-81 (1983) (pointing out that "excessive warnings on product labels may
be counterproductive").
91. See discussion of overload, supra notes 85-86. The United States Supreme Court, for
example, has stated that "[mleaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it
describes a balance between 'competing considerations of complete disclosure.., and the need
to avoid... [informational overload]'.. . . And striking the appropriate balance is an empiri-
cal process that entails investigation into consumer psychology." Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (citations omitted); see also cases cited supra note 76 (not-
ing that, in the pharmaceutical field, manufacturer supplied data allowed courts to apply the
remote danger rule in an apparently rational fashion); Robert W. Shuy, Warning Labels: Lan-
guage, Law, and Comprehensibility, AMEIwCAN SPEECH 65.4, 300 (1990) ("It is often said that
some half of all American readers cannot process sentences over 13 words long. Obviously, a
manufacturer concerned about communicating a danger message would make the sentences
shorter than 13 words in order to make the Warning section as readable as possible.").
In the legal and psychological literature, however, an active debate exists about the scien-
tific merits of the information overload hypothesis. Compare, e.g., David Grether et al., The
Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 294 (1986) ("[The best inference from the evidence is that consumers do not experience
serious problems as a result of the amount of information that markets and the state now
generate.") with Schwartz & Driver, supra note 11, at 59 ("The possibility of overwarning is an
important limitation on the length and comprehensiveness of a product warning .... A warn-
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The two courts that have directly confronted the problems of space
constraint and warning complexity have been unsuccessful in devising
workable solutions for them. In Broussard v. Continental Oil Co.,92 a
Louisiana appellate court held that Black & Decker, one of the defend-
ants, was not required to place any specific warnings on its electric hand
drill, since the face of the drill cautioned users to consult the owner's
manual, which explicitly described the relevant risks." The court ac-
knowledged both the physical impossibility of placing "multiple warn-
ings on a hand drill of the size and nature involved" and the distinct
likelihood that a "consumer would have a tendency to read none of the
warnings if the surface of the drill became cluttered with [them]."9 4 In
Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products Co.," the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reached the same conclusion about the wis-
dom of demanding an overly inclusive warning label on a propane gas
cylinder.96
Together, these courts took an important first step toward a more
functional approach to warnings law by recognizing that the implemen-
tation of a comprehensive risk rule for product warnings inevitably must
collide with the constraints of physical space. Neither court, however,
accompanied its keen practical insight with any rule of decision that
might rationalize warnings law. Instead, by creating yet another set of
tenuous legal distinctions, the opinions serve to muddy already murky
waters. Thus, in response to the problems caused by the practical limits
on label space, the Broussard court first created a distinction between
ing that attempts to address remote or trivial risks while simultaneously addressing those
hazards that represent an immediate and serious danger to the product user undermines its
own credibility.") and Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Educa-
tion Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE . ON REG. 159, 165 (1984)
("Researchers have found that simply conveying a message so that it is widely received and
understood can be exceedingly difficult .... [C]onsiderable data suggest disclosure techniques,
such as instructions and warning labels, do not work very well."). See also W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 96, at 686 (5th ed. 1984) ("Those
who argue for warning as the judicial solution to latent design defects labor under a naive
belief that one can warn against all significant risks. Too much detail can be counterproduc-
tive.").
For an overview of the scientific debate, compare W. Kip Viscusi et al., Informational
Regulation of Consumer Health Risks. An Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings, 17
RAND J. ECON. 351 (1986) (product hazard information is generally useful to consumers) with
Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 J. RiSK ANALYSIS 403 (1986)
(the task of providing consumers with useful risk information is beset with serious difficulties).
92. 433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983).
93. Id. at 358.
94. Id
95. 840 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 938 ("The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item.
Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out; they get lost in fine print.").
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"small" products and "large" products,97 and then held that specific risk
information need not appear on "small" products, provided they contain
a statement directing users to a comprehensive owner's manual.98
"Large" products presumably would have to display on their surfaces the
same kind of extensive risk information that should be included in an
adequate owner's manual. A manufacturer's warning obligations would
thus depend in part upon the size of its product, a criterion of questiona-
ble utility, and in part upon the existence of a comprehensive owner's
manual, an equally problematic factor.99
Moreover, while both the Cotton and Broussard courts criticized
lengthy warning labels as potentially confusing or discouraging to con-
sumers, neither court seemed to think that an equally lengthy owner's
manual might present consumers with the same prospect of confusion or
discouragement. Both courts appeared to encourage the makers of
"small" products to substitute a complicated owner's manual for a com-
prehensive warning label, but neither court offered any explanation of
how that substitution would meet the informational needs of consumers
or of how it would avoid the kind of "overload" that each decried. 1' °
Consequently, although the Broussard and Cotton cases are unique in
directly acknowledging some of the difficulties implicit in warning rules
that unduly expand the concept of relevant risk, each fails to furnish that
concept with workable meaning or to propose any useful alternative or
corollary to it.
In my opinion, no useful alternative exists. The occasional at-
97. Neither the Broussard court nor any of those who have praised its decision (a group
that includes Professors Henderson and Twerski and the Reporters to the ALI) have described
or even discussed a rational method for distinguishing between "large" and "small" products
for this purpose.
98. Broussard, 433 So. 2d at 358.
99. A theory that would have legal outcomes hinge on the presence of a comprehensive
owner's manual, as distinct from a comprehensive warning label, would open a Pandora's Box
of new problems, the most significant of which would be whether a product that was sold with
an adequate owner's manual would be deemed acceptable for warning purposes if that manual
were unavailable to the user, a situation that actually existed in Broussard but that was finessed
by the court without comment. Id. at 356.
100. There are important reasons for distinguishing generally between a manufacturer's
duty to warn consumers about the risks attendant upon product use and its duty to instruct
them about the safe and proper use of the product. A seller of dynamite, for example, proba-
bly need not warn buyers of its product's explosive quality, but must give them instructions for
its safe use. See Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763, 771 (Iowa 1974); Dempsey v.
Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 355, 359-60, 186 S.W.2d 217, 220 (1945). See gener-
ally Sales, supra note 11, at 553-57 (discussing differences between duty to warn and duty to
instruct). But those reasons do not explain how or why risk information that is arguably too
complex for the consumer when it appears in the form of a warning label becomes sufficiently
simple, for purposes of failure-to-warn doctrine, when it appears instead in an instructional or
owner's manual.
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tempts, like those in Broussard and Cotton, to rescue the doctrine from
itself by adjusting the scope of the warning requirement to fit the size of
the product, serve to illuminate the serious flaws in the doctrine but do
nothing to eliminate those flaws or to buffer their ill effects.
III. THE ExISTING APPROACH TO THE "ADEQUACY"
REQUIREMENT OF FAILURE-TO-WARN LAW
The dilemma created by the erosion of the rules of obvious and re-
mote danger, and by the practical impossibility of placing meaningful
limits on the notion of relevant risk, might by itself warrant a fundamen-
tal rethinking of failure-to-warn law. As significant and troubling as it is,
however, that dilemma is not the only serious problem afflicting warn-
ings law. Even if courts could somehow succeed in delimiting the con-
cept of risk, they still would need to solve the problem of elaborating the
broad doctrinal requirement that product warnings be "adequate."
Failure-to-warn law now obligates manufacturers not only to warn
consumers about relevant risks, but to do so in a manner deemed ade-
quate as to content, format, and audience.101 And unlike the issue of
"risk"--which courts have decided can be taken from the jury at the
obvious and remote ends of the spectrum-the issue of "adequacy" is one
peculiarly for the jury's determination.1 2 As they have with the notion
of risk, courts have struggled in vain with the adequacy requirement,
trying to bring solid legal form to a hopelessly malleable set of con-
cepts.10 3 In the process, they have proved that constructing a workable
notion of an "adequate" warning is at least as difficult a judicial task as
limiting the concept of "relevant" risk." 4
101. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962); MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140, 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (1985).
102. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1538-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir.
1979); MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 140, 475 N.E.2d at 68.
103. Compare, eg., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1087 (D.C. 1976) with
Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir. 1973). These two cases
involved the adequacy of a warning about the risks of a contact adhesive that seriously injured
plaintiffs when it ignited while being applied in the home. In the former, the appellate court
held that the warning, "Danger! Extremely Flammable ... Do Not Use Near Fire or Flame,"
was not adequate as a matter of law, Burch, 366 A.2d at 1087; in the latter, the trial court
found a similar warning adequate as a matter of law. Murray, 475 F.2d at 132.
104. Professor Schwartz has described the "adequacy" dilemma by attributing to the "una-
voidable imprecision of a firm's communications about risk levels" the fact that, from a post-
injury perspective, "there always exists a warning... that [was] not given and that would have
induced the injured consumer to avoid injury." Schwartz, supra note 12, at 397. According to
Schwartz, this circumstance helps explain why "warning cases often permit contradictory out-
comes: either the warning ... may be found exculpatory because the firm said enough.., or
1992]
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To appreciate the complexities entailed in defining an "adequate"
warning, consider the various ways in which current legal doctrine tests a
particular warning for adequacy. The general rule holds that an ade-
quate warning is one that is reasonable under the circumstances. 105
Courts have, however, divided this broad rule into a number of more
specific subparts. Thus, a product warning must be adequate with re-
spect to the content of its message; 10 6 that is, it must provide the con-
sumer with information about the "right" number of risks ("numerical
adequacy"). It must be adequate with respect to the format of its
message ("stylistic adequacy"); risk information must be designed to at-
tract the consumer's attention and expressed in a manner that not only is
intelligible to the average consumer but also expresses accurately the na-
ture and severity of the risks described. 07 It must also be adequate as to
the particular consumer, properly taking into account the consumer's ex-
pertise or lack thereof ("experiential adequacy")10 8 and his or her lan-
guage and literacy level ("linguistic adequacy")." °
A. In Practice, the Numerical Adequacy Rule Serves No Limiting
Function
In theory, the numerical adequacy rule could serve to ameliorate
some of the problems occasioned by the inevitably limitless nature of the
content-based approach to risk. One could imagine, for example, an ade-
quacy requirement that would continue to view almost all risk as rele-
vant, but that would admit the impossibility of successfully warning
about every relevant risk, and that would therefore regard as legally ade-
the warning... may be found defective because too little was said to tell the 'typical person'
about the risk and means to avoid it." Id.
105. See, eg., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (Ist Cir. 1981);
Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990).
106. See, eg., Deines, 755 F. Supp. at 353; Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498
(D. Kan. 1987), rev'd, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990).
107. See, eg., Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1979);
Dalton v. Tulane Toyota, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 575, 579 (E.D. La. 1981). One of the most com-
plete statements of this obligation appears in D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 234,
310 A.2d 106 (1973), where the court stated that whether a warning adequately makes the user
aware of a product's dangers and their severity "depends upon the language used and the
impression that it is calculated to make upon the mind of the average user of the product" and
involves "questions of display, syntax and emphasis." Id. at 230-31, 310 A.2d at 112.
108. See, eg., DuCote v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (La. Ct. App.) (no
need to warn expert in product use about dangers reasonably known to him but not to average
user of product), cert. denied, 457 So. 2d 15 (La. 1984); Todalen v. United States Chem. Co.,
424 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (manufacturer must develop product warnings that
appropriately consider inexperience or lack of skill of a foreseeable class of consumers).
109. See, eg., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 404-05 (Ist Cir. 1965);
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207-08, 485 A.2d 305, 310 (1984).
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quate a warning describing the five or ten "most important" product
hazards. The promise of that theory, however, is frustrated by judicial
practice.
As applied, the rule of numerical adequacy places no constraints on
the open-ended concept of risk. Most courts effectively ignore the limit-
ing potential of the rule. They choose instead to resolve the question of
numerical sufficiency by the same kind of risk-utility analysis ordinarily
employed in design defect cases, 110 ultimately reaching the foregone con-
clusion that manufacturers should expand the content of their warning
labels to include the additional message sought by plaintiffs. For these
courts, an inadequate warning label is one that could have been made
more comprehensive at relatively low cost, cost being regarded exclu-
sively as the number of dollars needed for the manufacturer to tack an-
other line or two of script onto its existing warning label.111 Confronted
with an injured plaintiff, a risk that has materialized, and a warning that
did not describe that risk, those courts decide easily and often that the
addition of a few words to the manufacturer's warning label would have
cost very little and would have prevented the plaintiff's expensive injury,
and that therefore the warning label was legally inadequate. 12
110. For a description of conventional risk-utility analysis and its method of application in
design defect cases, see supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text.
111. For a classic statement of this approach, see Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332
A.2d 11 (1975), in which the court stated:
We observe that in cases such as this the cost of giving an adequate warning is usu-
ally so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some more printing to a
label, that this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to
warn of latent dangers, if the manufacturer is otherwise required to do so.
Id at 543-44, 332 A.2d at 15; see also cases cited supra note 105 (noting the general rule that
an adequate warning is one that is reasonable under the circumstances). In computing their
calculations of cost, the Moran court and others like it neglect to consider how the additional
line or two of printing that they would require might itself generate important non-monetary
costs, such as the losses in consumer satisfaction and in manufacturer profitability attributable
to product sales foregone because of confusing or intimidating warnings, and the loss of con-
sumer comprehension occasioned by warning label "overload." When one also factors in the
possibility that a second court, or a third, might require that additional pieces of hazard infor-
mation be grafted onto the newly enlarged warning label, the developing picture of non-mone-
tary costs looks quite substantial. See, eg., ALvIN S. WEINSTEIN ET AL., PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT 62-64 (1978); Schwartz & Driver, supra
note 11, at 59. Perhaps courts overlook these non-monetary costs because they can not readily
quantify them, because they reject the "overload" phenomenon, or because the costs them-
selves seem speculative.
112. Courts may also decide that juries could properly make such a finding. See, e.g., Ross
Lab. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) ("The cost of giving an adequate warning is
usually so minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more printing to a label, that the balance must
always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn."); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87
N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981) ("Imposing the requirements of a proper
warning will seldom detract from the utility of the product."); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson
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B. Stylistic Adequacy: The Esoteric Tradition of Scholarship Revived
Most courts analyze questions of stylistic adequacy with the same
risk-utility calculus that they apply to issues of numerical sufficiency.
Changes in warning label format are almost always regarded as useful for
consumers 113 and inexpensive for manufacturers. While issues of numer-
ical adequacy, however, have a relatively confined field of inquiry-
should the warning have mentioned one more risk-issues of stylistic ad-
equacy provide an almost boundless area for possible judicial criticism.
In addition to the garden varieties of potential format-related insufficien-
cies, such as the clarity, 114 urgency, '15 or attention-getting quality116 of a
particular warning, courts have catalogued an impressive and bewilder-
ing assortment of possible deficiencies. For example, courts have found a
warning inadequate as to format because it was located too far back in
the product's owner's manual, 117 because the size of its type was too
small, 118 because it appeared in an instructional booklet for the product
instead of separately in a warning label, 119 and because it failed to pro-
vide specific instructions for using the product safely. 120
Taken together, this enormous assortment of potential inadequacies
Baby Prods. Co., 59 Wash. App. 287, 290, 797 P.2d 527, 527 (1990) (given its product's "po-
tential for serious harm," the burden on defendant, "essentially the cost of printing and affix-
ing a warning label, seems light indeed"); Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 142 Wis. 2d
798, 819, 419 N.W.2d 331, 339 (1987) (finding the cost of the additional warning to be
"insignificant").
113. In Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977), for example, the court found
there to be a meaningful difference between telling users of the Sabin oral polio vaccine that
they rarely could contract the disease from the vaccine, which is what the warning stated, and
telling them that they could contract the disease from the vaccine, the warning sought by
plaintiff. Id. at 1345. The risk of getting polio from the vaccine was one in three million. Id.
at 1343. In Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (1978), the court upheld
a jury finding of inadequacy of a warning that instructed users not to take sinus medicine for
more than ten days without consulting a physician because extended use "may damage the
kidneys." Id. at 652, 579 P.2d at 184. The plaintiff used the medicine for eight years without
consulting a physician. 1d. at 652-53, 579 P.2d at 184-85. The court held that the warning
should also have said that the drug was "dangerous." Id. at 655, 579 P.2d at 187.
114. See, e.g., Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. III. 1987).
115. See, e.g., Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72n11. App. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230
(1979).
116. See, e.g., Martinkovic, 669 F. Supp. at 215; Mahr, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 390 N.E.2d
at 1230.
117. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that jury could properly have found warning inadequate because it was placed on
page 13 of owner's manual, instead of on an earlier page).
118. See, e.g., id.; Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962).
119. See, e.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 564, 667 P.2d 750, 758 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983).
120. See, e.g., Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1087 (D.C. 1976).
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furnishes courts with an arsenal of critical weaponry capable of crippling
even the most carefully crafted product warning. By scrutinizing closely
the seemingly trivial details of type size, warning location, and relative
degree of expressed urgency, and by permitting outcomes to hinge on the
presence or absence of one or two seemingly innocuous words, courts
impose upon manufacturers a duty of virtual perfection, easily breached,
and satisfied only by chance.121
C. The "Average Consumer" and the Increasingly Common
Non-Average Consumer
In failure-to-warn law, the concept of the "average consumer" occu-
pies an ambiguous role. By demanding that product warnings ade-
quately address the "average" consumer, the failure-to-warn doctrine
seeks to ensure that a manufacturer speak to those people most likely to
use its product, about risks that are relevant to them, and in a language
that they can understand. Courts in warnings cases, however, have never
actually examined the characteristics of an "average consumer" of any
defendant's product, even though some particularized understanding of
that term might be thought essential to the judicial elaboration of many
of the critical requirements of warnings law. Instead of using an "aver-
age" geared to each defendant's product, most courts have referred to an
imaginary and almost universal construct, the average American
adult, 122 someone who buys every product and for whom an "average"
warning, written in English and describing "average" risks, might suffice.
No empirical study indicates the proportion of products for which the
average American adult is in fact the average consumer. For many prod-
ucts, however, the portrait of the average user must differ markedly from
that of the average American, and warnings on those products should
ideally take these differences into account.
To protect the informational interests of consumer groups whose
121. The real difficulty of this task is highlighted by the debate in scientific circles over
whether the format of a warning label matters at all and, if so, which changes in it are more or
less efficacious from the consumer's perspective. In summarizing the scientific literature about
consumers' perceptions of risk and risk information, a recent article concluded that "people's
perceptions of risks are often inaccurate" and colored too deeply by their immediate past ex-
periences, Bettman et al., supra note 85, at 2-5; that consumers "find it difficult to combine
multiple items of [risk] information and therefore may be biased in forming perceptions of the
overall risk associated with a product that has multiple risks," id. at 6; and that consumers
"have great difficulty in making decisions among risky options where [they] could experience a
gain or a loss." Id.
122. For the United States as a whole, the statistically average person is a 33-year old
white, urban-dwelling female with 12.7 years of formal education. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 12, 133
(110th ed. 1990).
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"average" member might not resemble the statistically representative
American, judges have created two distinct exceptions to this branch of
the adequacy rule. The first, sometimes called the "experienced user"
exception, obliges a manufacturer to consider the level of relevant exper-
tise possessed by the typical user of its product and to tailor its warning
label to the experience or ability level of that person.'23 Thus, a manu-
facturer who could reasonably foresee that its product would customarily
appeal to very experienced consumers could properly refrain from warn-
ing them about risks normally known to experts but not apparent to less
experienced users.124
Although the theoretical basis for the experienced user exception
seems sound, in application the rule poses problems. Since it hinges on
notions of relative expertise, the rule is subject to the same kind of defini-
tional uncertainty that plagues other terms in the lexicon of warnings
law. While in many cases courts will be able, without difficulty, to sepa-
rate the expert from the beginner, in many others that task and its logical
prerequisite--deciding what constitutes expertise-will be far more
troubling. Moreover, some courts further confuse the definitional issue,
improperly shifting their inquiry from the manufacturer's reasonable ex-
pectations about the user group in general to the particular user/plain-
tiff's knowledge of the risk that resulted in her injury. 125 This shift in
123. The "experienced user" exception has its genesis in comment k to § 338 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which requires the supplier of chattels to warn of inherently dan-
gerous conditions in its products "if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for
whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved."
Id. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 799 F.2d 993, 994 (5th
Cir. 1986).
124. Compare Todalen v. United States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79-80 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that manufacturer must consider user's lack of special knowledge of risks asso-
ciated with caustic cleaning product in designing and drafting its warning label and that
whether such label is adequate is proper question for jury) with DuCote v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 451 So. 2d 1211, 1215 (La. Ct. App.) (holding there was no obligation to inform electri-
cian of risk of electrocution from using ungrounded power saw), cert. denied, 457 So. 2d 15
(La. 1984) and Mackowick v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 525 Pa. 52, 57, 575 A.2d 100, 103
(1990) (holding no obligation to warn experienced electrician about danger that certain electri-
cal equipment might arc). See also Merklin v. United States, 788 F.2d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[Tihe supplier of a dangerous chattel has no duty to warn those who are experienced in the
handling of the chattel."); Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.
1980) ("[N]o one needs notice of that which he already knows."); Toppi v. United States, 332
F. Supp. 513, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding no duty to warn exists when user realized danger-
ousness of chemical). Some courts limit the relevant world of experienced users to "profes-
sionals" and "skilled tradespeople," without, however, specifically defining any of those terms.
See, eg., Merklin, 788 F.2d at 178; Billar, 623 F.2d at 243-44.
125. A recent case from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals typifies this misguided
approach. In East Penn Mfg. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 1990), plaintiff, a truck
mechanic with 20 years of experience, was blinded in one eye while attempting to charge a
truck battery made by defendant. Id. at 1116. The battery exploded during the charging
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emphasis unfairly exposes manufacturers to liability for failing to predict
unforeseeable shortcomings in particular plaintiffs.
The pitfalls associated with the experienced user exception, how-
ever, pale in comparison to those associated with the other exception to
the "average user" rule, which might be called the "linguistic adequacy"
exception. This latter exception compels manufacturers to draft their
warning labels in a manner comprehensible not just to average users of
their products but to smaller groups of non-average users as well. A
number of courts interpret this exception to require manufacturers to
recognize "the existence of many in the work force who do not read Eng-
lish" '126 and to couch their product warnings either in easily understood
symbols or in a language that the user can read.1 27
A requirement that a manufacturer make its warning information
intelligible to users who either are not literate at all, or not literate in
English, correctly addresses several important social and legal concerns.
The number of illiterate and functionally illiterate Americans is very
large. According to a 1979 report of the Ford Foundation, twenty-five
million Americans cannot read at all and an additional thirty-five million
are functionally illiterate.1 28 Though more recent estimates of the size of
this group differ, even the most conservative estimate places the number
of functional illiterates at approximately ten percent of the adult popula-
process, striking plaintiff's face with battery acid and metal fragments. Id. at 1115-16. Plain-
tiff testified at trial that prior to the accident he had charged truck batteries at least 500 times,
all without incident. Id at 1116. His complaint alleged, among other things, that defendant
should have warned him about the risk that its battery might explode. Id Defendant con-
tended in response that plaintiff was an experienced user who should have known of the risk of
explosion. Id. at 1119-20. Rather than ask whether the class of product users with plaintiff's
experience were owed a warning about this particular hazard, the court looked instead to the
actual knowledge that the plaintiff possessed about that particular risk, determined that a
"properly detailed" warning would have told him something that he did not know, and on that
basis upheld a jury verdict in his favor. Id at 1120-21. No manufacturer should face liability
for failing to anticipate the idiosyncratic gaps of knowledge in the background of the true but
imperfect expert. See Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir.
1981); West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So. 2d 598, 606 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
126. Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 208, 485 A.2d 305, 309-11
(1984).
127. See id.; Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402,405 (1st Cir. 1965) (The
"jury could reasonably have believed that defendant should have foreseen that its ... product
would be used by, among others, persons... of limited education and reading ability," and
that its warning, "because of its lack of a skull and bones or other comparable symbols or
hieroglyphics," would not be adequate.).
128. William McGowan, Iliterasee Att Wurk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1982, at A27. The
term "functionally illiterate" describes people unable to read and write at a level of proficiency
adequate for everyday life. See Jill Zuckman, Senate Approves Legislation to Combat Illiteracy,
48 CONG. Q. 391, 391 (1990).
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tion 2 9 Permitting manufacturers to draft warning labels that ignore
such a sizeable portion of the population would work a significant hard-
ship on a particularly disadvantaged segment of society.
Moreover, if product warning labels are properly to serve the func-
tion of preventing injury, manufacturers should employ a methodology
of information exchange that communicates clearly and effectively with
all of the relevant populations at risk. The use of just one kind of warn-
ing label, written in English and directed exclusively at literate consum-
ers, not only neglects the needs of other sizeable segments of our
population, but also subjects those groups to risks of serious harm that
consumers literate in English are helped to avoid. The unfairness of such
a regime seems patent.
What to do about that unfairness, however, is a difficult question.
Two courts have suggested that in certain circumstances manufacturers
should substitute symbols of some kind for the English words that would
otherwise comprise their product warnings. 130  For other products, it
might be more appropriate to require manufacturers to draft their warn-
ings in Spanish,"'1 for example, to meet the risk information needs of this
country's largest non-English speaking group.1 32 Each of these options
raises difficult questions of its own. As to symbols, for instance, when
129. Compare Phillip G. Vargas, In the Shadow of the Mainstream; Without English, My
Hispanic Countrymen Are Doomed to Fail in America, WASH. POST, March 31, 1991, at B5
("[A]bout 56 percent of Hispanic adults are functionally illiterate in English, compared with
44 percent of blacks and 16 percent of whites.") with Zuckman, supra note 128, at 391 (observ-
ing that twenty-three million American adults are functionally illiterate and four million are
completely unable to read or write).
130. See Hubbard Hall, 340 F.2d at 402 (lst Cir. 1965); Campos, 98 N.J. at 208, 485 A.2d
at 305. In neither case, however, did the court indicate which symbols might be appropriate,
or to what sources manufacturers might acceptably turn to find appropriate symbols.
131. According to the 1980 Census, eight million adults and almost three million children
speak Spanish at home. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 43. Of this group, approximately 28% of the
adults and 15% of the children have difficulty speaking English. Id. Two hundred eighty-one
of the 310 jurisdictions required to furnish multilingual ballots under the Voting Rights Act of
1975, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1981 & Supp. 1985), involve Spanish speakers. ARNOLD H.
LEIBowrrz, FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY LANGUAGE GROUPS 8
(1982). As of 1984, Spanish-speaking children comprised almost 80% of the total enrollment
in bilingual education programs. Susan H. Boren, Education of Hispanics: Access and Achieve-
ment, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 7, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1983). See generally,
Joseph Leibowicz, Current Topic, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or
Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y Rv. 519, 522-24 (1985) (examining Spanish-speaking Ameri-
cans' disincentives for learning English). According to some estimates, more than half of all
Hispanic adults are functionally illiterate in English. See Vargas, supra note 129, at B5.
132. These needs appear substantial. According to a recent article in The New York Times,
Hispanic factory and industrial workers in this country suffer more frequent and more serious
job-related injuries than white and black workers in similar jobs. See Peter T. Kilborn, For
Hispanic Immigrants, a Higher Job-Injury Risk, N.Y. TIMES, February 18, 1992, at Al. Ex-
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should they be required? Should they be included on almost all products,
since it seems possible that practically any product can be used by practi-
cally anyone, literate or not? Or should only that group of products
"likely" in some fashion to be used by illiterate or functionally illiterate
consumers include such symbols? Further, what proportion of the user
group must be illiterate before the manufacturer needs to add a symbolic
warning to its written one, or to replace the latter with the former?133
Finally, if we assume that symbols might sometimes be a desirable alter-
native to written language, which symbols should manufacturers adopt
and why?134
Indeed, if the core purposes of failure-to-warn doctrine dictate that
product warnings be intelligible to all linguistically significant groups of
consumers, how can courts halt the momentum of that dictate short of
requiring that manufacturers blanket their products with as many sepa-
rate warnings as there are "linguistically significant groups"?' 3 5 In the
absence of such a requirement, large numbers of consumers might not
receive risk information that they could fully understand. But the exist-
ence of such a requirement could easily spawn comprehensive multi-lin-
perts on health and safety in the workplace attribute this phenomenon in part to the Hispanic
workers' low level of formal education and their generally poor knowledge of English. Id.
133. In this respect neither Hubbard-Hall nor Campos is particularly helpful. In neither
case did the court discuss the numbers or percentages of product users that would need to be
illiterate or Spanish-speaking, for example, before a court could properly require a manufac-
turer to alter or amend its existing warning label. Hubbard-Hall, 340 F.2d at 405; Campos, 98
N.J. at 208, 485 A.2d at 309-11. The reasoning that seems to have fueled the decisions in
Hubbard-Hall and Campos is that the particular minority in question, the illiterate or the
Spanish-speaking, constitutes an unmeasured but sufficiently large minority of product users to
justify a warning label drafted with that minority's specific communication needs in mind.
This intuition, logically extended, might require that all products contain either "appropriate"
warning symbols or a series of warnings, each in a language intelligible to an unmeasured but
"significant minority" of product users.
134. No one has yet developed a set of generally accepted risk or hazard symbols that are
comprehensible to most of the populace. Moreover, even if one could devise an acceptable
symbolic vocabulary, those symbols would be truly useful only if they were understandable to
the illiterate and the functionally illiterate, groups whose comprehension seems particularly
difficult to study and test. See W. Kip Vlscusi, RFFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 145
(1991).
135. The United States Census Bureau does not publish data about the numbers of non-
Hispanic minority groups in this country who speak or read in a language other than English.
In the past 15 years, however, a number of lawsuits have been brought pursuant to the Bilin-
gual Education Act of 1968, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3262 (1988), alleging that various non-English-
speaking groups have been denied the educational assistance promised by the Act. From these
suits, it is possible to glean some idea of the numbers of minorities who might benefit from
warning labels in their own language. See, eg., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974)
(Chinese speakers); Zambrano v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. 584503-9 (Alameda Sup.
Ct., May 1, 1985) (a class of Cambodian, Filipino, Hispanic, and "other Asian" minorities),
cited in Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 73 CAL. L. Rnv. 321, 335
n.78 (1987).
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gual warning labels that might intimidate or confuse consumers, causing
them to ignore all of the risk information, including that in their own
language.
Although no court has yet extended the logic of the experienced-
user and linguistic-adequacy exceptions beyond the obvious parameters
of expertise and language, the theoretical influence of these exceptions
does not necessarily stop at those borders. If "adequate" product warn-
ings are only those that significant groups of consumers can truly under-
stand, then perhaps manufacturers might eventually have to consider
how to gear their warnings to consumers of different race,1 36 age,137 and
gender, 13' and makers of children's products might need to tailor their
136. Susceptibility to alcoholism, for example, may be positively correlated with race. See
Stanton Peele, 4 Moral Vision of 4ddiction: How People's Values Determine Whether They
Become and Remain Addicts, 17 J. DRUG ISSUES 187, 189-94 (1987). For an opposing view,
see John S. Searles, The Role of Genetics in the Pathogenesis of,41oholism, 97 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 153, 153-64 (1988). For a bibliography cataloguing the recent studies of alcoholism
among blacks, see Thomas D. Watts & Roosevelt Wright, Black41coholism, 33 J. ALCOHOL &
DRUG EDUC. 76, 78-80 (1988). In the past several years, moreover, a number of manufactur-
ers of alcoholic beverages have developed and marketed certain products specifically for partic-
ular racial groups. Power Master, a malt liquor that would have had the highest alcohol
content of any malt beverage on the market, was a failed attempt by the G. Heileman Brewing
Company to target black consumers. Withdrawn from the market in the summer of 1991
following community protests even before it reached the shelves, Power Master represented
the latest in a line of products aimed at discrete groups of consumers, a line that includes
Uptown cigarettes (aimed at the black smoker), Cisco fortified wine (the Hispanic buyer), and
Dakota cigarettes ("less educated, working women"). Thomas Palmer, 4 Target-Marketing
Ploy Backfires: Malt Liquor Aimed at Blacks Dies 4borning, a Victim of Insensitivity, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 14, 1991, (Focus), at 71.
137. It seems intuitively correct, for example, that warnings on products marketed primar-
ily to the elderly should allow at a minimum for the problems of impaired eyesight (which
might necessitate the use of larger type in the warning label) and of diminished dexterity
(which might require a special emphasis on particular kinds of product risks).
138. In her highly controversial work, the psychologist Carol Gilligan has contended that,
starting in early childhood, males and females display strikingly different styles of moral rea-
soning. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 5-23 (1982). While many disagree
with Gilligan's thesis, see, eg., Catherine Greeno & Elanor E. Macoby, How Different is the
"Different Voice"?, 11 SIGNS 310 (1986), many others embrace it as a "feminine vision" of a
"virtue-based ideology" that has otherwise been "conspicuously absent from the shaping of
[American] moral or political traditions." Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional .4djudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 591 (1986). Gilligan's perspective
might be extended logically, if not empirically, to the notion that women receive and process
risk data differently from men.
Some recent cases dealing with claims of sex discrimination in the workplace have ana-
lyzed sexual harassment from the particular perspective of women, adopting a methodology of
proving discrimination that employs the standard of the "reasonable woman." Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e hold that a female plaintiff states a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reason-
able woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment."); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting a reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment case);
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warnings to the "reasonable child" of the relevant age group 13 9
Such an extensive and potentially diverse set of requirements would,
as a practical matter, signal an end to the average consumer standard in
the area of failure-to-warn. The exceptions would swallow the rule.
Even without the judicial adoption of all the exceptions described above,
existing departures from the standard have substantially eroded the pre-
vailing rule, perhaps with good reason, and made it much more difficult
to apply. In addition to imagining the average consumer, juries must
even now attempt to imagine the average expert, the average beginner,
the average illiterate, and the average person illiterate in English but lit-
erate in another language. They must then decide whether the product
warning at issue speaks adequately to the particular listener.
Moreover, the three components of the "adequacy" requirement fre-
quently interact with each other. A change in style or format, for exam-
ple, could easily disrupt the communicative efficacy of the warning as a
whole, necessitating one or more countervailing alterations to other as-
pects of the warning label." ° Consider, for example, a warning adequate
in all respects for English-speaking, middle-class women with average
experience in using the product. Changing the warning to direct it at an
audience, for example, of Spanish-speaking women unfamiliar with the
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1525 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (same).
The adoption of the reasonable woman standard was prompted at least in part by the courts'
conclusion that, as to conduct in the workplace that arguably constitutes sexual harassment,
men and women generally have quite different perspectives about what comprises objectiona-
ble behavior. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879; Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1525.
In fact, certain handgun manufacturers have recently "targeted" women as an untapped
market and now make guns, such as Smith & Wesson's "Ladysmith," especially for them. See
Laura Zinn, This Bud's For You. No, Not You - Her, BusINEss WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 86.
This marketing strategy probably increases the risk that loaded handguns will be kept in an
environment containing young children-who could find the guns and injure themselves or
others-and may necessitate warnings drafted with these special considerations in mind.
139. Children's products manufacturers may at least need to draft warnings in a manner
that would provide parents with specific instructions about the best way to communicate rele-
vant risk information to the children/users. See, eg., April A. Caso, Note, Unreasonably Dan-
gerous Products From a Child's Perspective: A Proposal for a Reasonable Child Consumer
Expectation Test, 20 RuTGERs L.J. 433, 450-59 (1989); Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability for
Personal Injury to Minors, 56 VA. L. REv. 1223, 1228-31 (1970).
140. This phenomenon resembles the problem of polycentricity first articulated by Profes-
sor Lon L. Fuller. See Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L.
REv. 3, 4-5. Professor Fuller argued that those matters least amenable to successful adjudica-
tion are issues that cannot be analytically isolated; that is, when a litigant's position on one
issue would necessarily change in response to the court's resolution of some other issue linked
to the first, the issue in question cannot be isolated for purposes of analysis and is subject
instead to countless analytical variants. Id Professor Henderson has argued that the problem
of polycentricity infects the judicial resolution of design defect cases. See James A. Henderson,
Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1531, 1534-73 (1973).
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product, would obviously necessitate a change in the content of the warn-
ing-since that type of user will need and want different kinds of risk
information-but it might also compel a change in the format of the la-
bel, to account for the different ways in which that second group
processes risk information. The need to consider this aspect of the ade-
quacy issue multiplies both the complexity involved in drafting an ade-
quate warning and the possibility that any particular warning will in
some way be deemed inadequate.
The "adequacy" half of traditional failure-to-warn law is thus
equally as problematic as the "risk" half, and perhaps more so. Rather
than diminish or disentangle the problems created by the collapse of the
obvious and remote danger rules, the adequacy requirements create addi-
tional difficulties that amplify the basic dilemmas of warnings doctrine.
In elaborating upon the adequacy requirement, courts have announced
several distinct rules of "adequacy," each incapable of being usefully de-
fined or coherently described. When applying those rules to specific
warning labels, courts scrutinize the wording, location, degree of ur-
gency, type, size, and other attributes of the label's style and content with
the microscopic interest and single-minded vigor of medieval monks,
criticizing everything but clarifying nothing. Consequently, when the
"risk" and "adequacy" halves of warnings law are pieced together, the
picture that emerges is one of a doctrine whose two main components
defy theoretical coherence and encourage seemingly random results: a
risk requirement so open-ended that it is practically all-encompassing,
and an adequacy rule so expansive in scope and picayune in application
that almost no warning format can consistently satisfy its demands.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PARADOXES CREATED BY THE COLLAPSE
OF FAILURE-TO-WARN LAW
As a result of the collapse of its limiting rules for risk and of an
obsessively baroque approach to its adequacy inquiry, current failure-to-
warn doctrine not only confuses the quest for theoretical integrity in
warnings cases, but impedes the attainment of the important social goals
that animate warnings law. This disarray that defines existing doctrine
undermines the institutional interests of courts, manufacturers, and con-
sumers alike.
Because failure-to-warn law lacks internal coherence, courts are un-
able to articulate rational grounds for deciding and distinguishing partic-
ular cases. In the absence of effective limiting rules, the "risk"
component of the doctrine has expanded exponentially to include all
product-related risk. As a result, those courts that would permit the use
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of less inclusive warning labels must not only justify their deviation from
the logic of this limitless rule, but must also explain why consumers may
lawfully be denied information about risks which are, by definition, le-
gally relevant. At the same time, those courts that would fully enforce
this expansive doctrine by insisting on fully comprehensive warnings ex-
pose consumers to the prospect of confusion or discouragement over the
length or complexity of exhaustive risk information. The rules of ade-
quacy, with their innumerable points of possible insufficiency, do nothing
to cabin the notion of risk, but instead force courts to grope for meaning-
ful differences between adequate warnings and perfect ones. For the judi-
ciary, then, the collapse of the limiting rules of obviousness and
remoteness, coupled with a minutely detailed approach to warning ade-
quacy, has created a legal doctrine burdened with an insoluble paradox:
because almost all risks have come to be defined as legally relevant, an
effective warning must mention almost all risks; an all-encompassing
warning can dull consumer response to risk information, however, frus-
trating the adequacy principle of warnings law and undermining the ba-
sic doctrinal goal of injury prevention.
Moreover, current law hamstrings manufacturers. Required to pro-
vide product warnings, but furnished neither with practical limitations
on the kinds of risks that they must mention nor with any useful pre-
scription for a properly drafted warning, manufacturers must attempt an
impossible balancing act. They must either describe almost everything
that might constitute a hazard, and thus jeopardize the efficacy and intel-
ligibility of their warnings and raise for themselves the prospect of poten-
tial liability,14 or they must knowingly edit from those warnings any
mention of possibly obvious or remote risks and thereby flirt with the
distinct likelihood that if one of those risks results in serious injury, they
will be found responsible. At the same time, they must hope that their
choices of language, syntax, format, and location square with the numer-
ous unspoken adequacy criteria of judges and juries. A disembodied risk
rule and an incurably recondite inquiry into the particulars of adequacy
thus threaten the manufacturer with liability for too much warning and
141. Courts have sometimes permitted plaintiffs to challenge an otherwise adequate prod-
uct warning by showing that additional, off-label information issued by the defendant diluted
the strength of its warning. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65-69, 507
P.2d 653, 661-64, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53-56 (1973) (holding that the potential dilution of prod-
uct warning by overpromotion of drug by salespeople is question for jury); Incollingo v. Ew-
ing, 444 Pa. 263, 300, 282 A.2d 206, 221-22 (1971) (same decision in case involving the
promotion of chloromycetin to the medical profession). The logical bridge extending liability
from off-label information that dulls a warning's acuity to on-label information with the same
effect does not seem very long.
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liability for too little warning, without providing any real clue as to what
constitutes too much or too little.
Finally, although class-based logic might suggest that what harms
manufacturers must help consumers, it seems much more likely that
product users suffer as well from the confusion that dominates warnings
law. By neglecting to establish workable standards for manufacturers,
courts subject product users to the perplexing and unpleasant prospect of
a regime of warnings that are sometimes incomplete and sometimes too
complete, but that need not conform to any set of considered criteria. By
exposing manufacturers to seemingly random liability for breaches of the
adequacy requirement, courts discourage them from developing
processes that might rationalize and systematize the drafting of product
warnings and that might better serve consumer health. By adhering to a
content-based method of decision focused exclusively on a particular cir-
cumstantial mix of risk, harm, and warning, courts create remedies for
individual consumers after the injury, instead of promoting prevention
beforehand for large groups of consumers. By failing to forge a doctrinal
alternative to their inevitably unsatisfying inquiry into the substance of
particular warnings, courts also abandon the safety interests of consum-
ers generally, protect the rights only of the relatively few that bring
suit,142 and increase the exposure of most consumers to product-related
harm, the very consequence that the law of failure-to-warn attempts to
avoid.
V. THE CAUSATION COMPONENT OF FAILURE-TO-WARN
Traditionally, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on his claim in tort,
142. Logic suggests, and data confirm, that the revolution in products liability law, by
expanding the grounds on which injured consumers can sue for product-related harms, has led
to a substantial increase in the absolute number of product liability claims. See DEBORAH H.
HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 33
(1987). Because the parameters of failure-to-warn doctrine are so hopelessly indistinct, and
the prima facie case so simple for plaintiffs to prove, failure-to-warn law probably accounts for
a disproportionate share of this increased number of claims. The existence of a larger number
of claims does not speak, however, to the more important question of what percentage of
negligently injured consumers actually sue and recover for harm caused by inadequate product
warnings. A significant empirical study that asked that question about medical malpractice
actions concluded that "at most one in 10 incidents of malpractice result [sic] in a claim, and
of these, less than half, or one in 25, receive payment." Patricia M. Danzon, An Economic
Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 39, 42 (1983). A more recent
study concludes that "the fraction of medical negligence that leads to [malpractice] claims is
probably under 2 percent." A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims
and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991). Some com-
mentators have argued that a similar phenomenon characterizes products liability law. See,
e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447-61
(1987).
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he must prove causation. 43 Generally, this requirement has several
parts. First, the behavior on which liability is predicated has to be a
"but-for" cause (or a cause-in-fact) of the injury. 1" Second, that behav-
ior must be related proximately to the injury. 45 The causation require-
ment thus obliges plaintiffs to demonstrate the factual and legal
etiological connection between their harm and the defendant's act or
omission.14
6
As with the other essential elements of a negligence action 47 for
which the plaintiff normally bears the burden of proof,148 courts occa-
sionally shift the causation burden or otherwise adjust it in the general
interests of fairness. 49 It might seem logical that in order to contain the
damage done by the collapse of the risk and adequacy rules, courts
should alter the causation burden in warnings cases to make it more de-
manding for plaintiffs and should then use that higher standard to sift the
arguably "weak" cases from the larger pile of claims amassed, in part,
143. See generally H.L.A. HART & ToNY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed.
1985) (examining the development of the causation requirement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 430 (1964) (outlining general principles of causation).
144. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1964) (noting that, in most
cases, the behavior must be a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm).
145. See, eg., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 343-46, 162 N.E. 99, 100-01
(1928); KEETON et al., supra note 91, § 42, at 272-80.
146. For a classic description of causation, see KEETON et al., supra note 91, § 41, at 263-
68. The academic literature discussing and analyzing the problems inherent in the develop-
ment of a rational concept of causation is voluminous. For a representative sampling, see
ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); Leon Green, The Causal
Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1962); Fleming James, Jr. & Roger
F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Cau-
sation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 189 (1952); Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957); E.
Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1.
147. The essential elements of negligence are duty, breach, and harm. See KEETON et al.,
supra note 91, § 30, at 164-65.
148. Id. at 239.
149. This burden-shifting sometimes occurs with the elements of duty and breach, as wit-
nessed by the development and expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, see, eg., Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944), and also occurs, quite dramatically
in recent years, with respect to causation. See, eg., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (1980) (burden of proving causation shifted
under theory of "market share liability"); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5
(1948) (burden of proving causation shifted to defendants under theory of "alternative liabil-
ity"); see also Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1069-71, 751 P.2d 470,
483-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424-26 (1988) (noting the "market share" theory in support of a
shift of the burden of proof to defendants); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 505-
12, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 945-50 (discussing the validity of several
theories of recovery to provide plaintiffs with a cause of action and support a granting of relief
to plaintiffs), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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from the failure of the risk and adequacy sieves. In fact, however, the
courts have done no such thing.
Instead of cushioning the impact of the risk and adequacy problems
by adding to a plaintiff's burden of proof on causation, courts have erred
in the opposite direction. In so doing, the courts have eased that burden
and amplified the effect of those already formidable problems. Several
commentators have perceptively described some aspects of the causation
quandary in warnings law,' arguing that a plaintiff's prima facie proof
of causation is too easy to establish, too difficult to rebut, and practically
impossible to prove as a matter of science.151 Those commentators con-
tend that these elements turn the causation question into "a mirage, ' 15 2
contribute to a standard "without content," and result in an analysis that
is "completely ad hoc."15 3 They claim, however, that the complications
inherent in this methodology could be readily untangled, if courts would
simply abandon the pro-plaintiff presumption arguably derived from
comment j to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 154 and
replace it with "a more fact-intensive approach."1 5
For the reasons described below, this claim fails to strike effectively
at the heart of the causation problem in failure-to-warn law. Whether
proved objectively or subjectively, factually or intuitively, causation in
warnings cases is peculiarly and innately a simple matter for plaintiffs.
No amount of judicial tinkering can make it otherwise. Altering the
terms of the causation requirement cannot redress the doctrinal imbal-
ance created by the indeterminacy of the concepts of risk and adequacy.
150. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 305-10.
151. Id at 307.
152. Id at 308-09.
153. Id at 310.
154. Comment j provides: "Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that
it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is
followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). The causation presumption arguably arising from
that comment holds in effect that if courts must presume that users would read and heed an
adequate warning actually provided them, then courts must also presume, by a process of
converse reasoning, that consumers would have read and heeded an adequate warning, in those
cases where the manufacturer failed to give them one. See, e.g., Benoit v. Ryan Chevrolet, 428
So. 2d 489, 493 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d
1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 54-55, 373 A.2d 505, 506-07 (1977);
see also 3 AM. L. PRODS. LIAB. § 32:74, at 117-18 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing presumptions and
burden of proof in product liability cases; citing cases in support of the issues described
therein).
155. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 326 n.250 (citing as an example of a better ap-
proach that taken in Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 897 F.2d 94, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1990) (causa-
tion should not be presumed but "may sometimes be inferred from the facts and
circumstances")).
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Neither shifting nor strengthening the burden of proof for that require-
ment can bring coherence to a basically amorphous body of law.
As with proof of causation in negligence actions generally, proving
causation in failure-to-warn cases usually requires that a plaintiff estab-
lish several critical facts. In all cases, the plaintiff must first show that
the manufacturer failed either to place a warning label on its product or
to make its existing warning label legally adequate. This requirement is
not part of the causation inquiry, but goes instead to the question of
whether the defendant has breached a duty that it owes to the plaintiff.
Unless the plaintiff can satisfactorily prove duty and breach, the causa-
tion question is moot. The plaintiff must then show that he would have
read, understood, and heeded an adequate warning, thus avoiding the
injury in question. 156 If the plaintiff establishes all of these facts, he will
have demonstrated the requisite link between his own harm and the de-
fendant's failure to provide an adequate warning.
In other areas of product liability law, those involving alleged de-
fects of manufacturing and of design, proving causation is often a difficult
matter for plaintiffs.157 The possibility of product misuse or mishan-
dling, either by the plaintiff or others, complicates the showing in the
former type of case;- 58 in the latter, the need for the plaintiff to suggest a
156. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 969-70 (Ala. 1985); Mampe
v. Ayerst Lab., 548 A.2d 798, 801-02 (D.C. 1988); Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d
602, 604 (rex. 1972). The Model Uniform Products Liability Act provides that a plaintiff
must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that if adequate warnings had been provided
... a reasonably prudent product user would have either declined to use the product or would
have used the product in a manner so as to have avoided the harm." MODEL UNIFORM PROD.
LIABILITY AcT § 104(c)(3) (1979).
157. The academic literature on this score is voluminous. For some of the more recent
work, see, e.g., David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv.
339, 343 (1974); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 368; Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational The-
ory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappoint-
ment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1251 (1974); Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict Products Liability and
the Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. Rlv. 2045,
2045-49 (1984). See generally David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Lia-
bility, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980) (discussing the developmental stages of products liability
law as influenced by public policy goals of locating the party best able to bear the costs in-
curred); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 573 (1990) (assessing the development of the risk-utility analysis in products liability
law).
158. Professor Epstein, for example, has observed that questions of proof in this area "can
be formidable, especially for long-lived products or those that receive intensive and protracted
use." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 665 (5th ed. 1990); see, e.g.,
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St. 3d 1, 7-9, 523 N.E.2d 489, 494-96
(1988) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove defect in
car's electric wiring). See generally Paul D. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability
Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325, 325-43 (1971) (describing and analyzing various methods of
proving the existence of a defect in products litigation).
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viable alternative to defendant's existing product design in order to pre-
vail under standard risk-utility analysis usually requires that he present
expert testimony that a specific alternative design, safer than defendant's
and commercially feasible, could have prevented his injuries. 159
In the failure-to-warn area, the causation difficulties found in cases
of manufacturing or design defect do not exist. For warnings claims,
almost all courts have adopted one of two approaches to causation, either
of which makes it relatively easy for plaintiffs to satisfy their burden of
proof. Some courts employ the pro-plaintiff presumption derived from
comment j, 160 a measure that frees plaintiffs from the obligation to prove
either their general inclination to read and obey product warnings or the
fact that they have actually done so in the particular case. All of that
critical evidence is presumed. Although the presumption is rebuttable, it
would nevertheless seem that defendants seeking to rebut it (by showing,
for example, that plaintiff was the kind of reckless person who habitually
ignored his own safety in general, and warning labels in particular)
would do so at some substantial peril to any positive regard that the jury
might have for them. Rare indeed are cases involving the admitted fail-
ure by plaintiff to read an allegedly inadequate warning. 161 The adoption
of this pro-plaintiff presumption thus seems virtually to guarantee that
plaintiffs in warnings cases will be able to prove causation with little
difficulty.
Not all courts have adopted this pro-plaintiff presumption as to cau-
sation. Those declining to do so have nevertheless found an alternative
mechanism that alleviates a plaintiff's potential difficulties of proof. In
these jurisdictions, courts employ a subjective standard for establishing
causation, allowing a plaintiff to testify-after the fact of his injury, of
course-as to whether he would have read and heeded an adequate warn-
ing had the defendant placed one on its product.162 This kind of inquiry
does not produce much in the way of surprise. Plaintiffs invariably say
that they would have read the missing or inadequate warning and that
159. See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring plain-
tiff to prove the relative risks and costs of alternative designs in order to prevail on design
defect claim against manufacturer of forklift); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253,
259, 589 P.2d 896, 900 (1979) (same with regard to design defect claim against maker of
mobile homes); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 268, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976) (same as
to maker of football helmets).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. j (1965); see supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
161. Such cases are rare, but not unknown. See, e.g., Mampe v. Ayerst Lab., 548 A.2d 798,
802-03 (D.C. 1988); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1987).
162. See, eg., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 730 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding
plaintiff's own testimony that he would have heeded a warning if given one sufficient to estab-
lish proximate cause).
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they would have heeded it as well. As with the pro-plaintiff presumption
discussed above, defendants have the opportunity on cross-examination
to attack plaintiff's testimony on this score, but the strategical risks of
attempting such an attack are, once again, substantial. In these jurisdic-
tions, as in those adopting the pro-plaintiff presumption, most plaintiffs
have practically proven causation before their trial even begins.
In theory, there exists a third approach to the causation inquiry: the
objective approach. This approach would neither allow for a pro-plain-
tiff presumption nor permit the plaintiff to testify about her hypothetical
reactions to an adequate warning. Rather, it would ask whether a rea-
sonable person in plaintiff's circumstances immediately before the acci-
dent in question would have read and heeded an adequate product
warning. Such an approach would not be new to tort law. In the area of
informed consent to medical treatment, for example, a significant
number of courts have decided that the better method of resolving the
causation question is to ask "what a prudent person in the patient's posi-
tion would have decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing
significance." '163
An objective method of establishing causation in warnings cases
would arguably have all of the advantages usually attributed to objectiv-
ity. Instead of relying on the post-injury testimony of an inevitably bi-
ased, seriously injured plaintiff, and instead of presuming that every
plaintiff will always read and obey every warning, the objective approach
would concentrate on the course of conduct that would have been taken
before the injury by a hypothetical reasonable person. If that person
would have read and obeyed an adequate warning, then a jury could
fairly conclude that defendant's negligence in failing to provide such a
163. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972), was the first opinion to adopt the objective approach to causation in informed consent
cases. The court there explicitly rejected the subjective approach, declaring that it placed the
factfinder in the position of "deciding whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question
is to be credited," and called for a determination based solely on the "testimony of a patient-
witness shadowed by the occurrence of the undisclosed risk." Id. The court continued, "Bet-
ter it is, we believe, to resolve the causality issue on an objective basis: in terms of what a
prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of all perils
bearing significance." Id.
California was one of the first states to adopt the objective standard announced in Canter-
bury. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
The Cobbs court held that the objective standard, though not completely consonant with the
principle of patient autonomy, is nevertheless preferable because it does not place the physician
"in jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment" that might arise with "the vision
of 20/20 hindsight." Id. New Jersey, in Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504, 510
(1988), was one of the most recent jurisdictions to adopt the objective standard. Id. at 214-15,
540 A.2d at 509-10. Oregon, among others, has rejected the objective test. See Arena v. Ging-
rich, 305 Or. 1, 5-6, 748 P.2d 547, 549-50 (1988).
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warning caused plaintiff's injury. If not, then the plaintiff could not pre-
vail on the causation issue and would therefore lose her case.
On its surface the objective approach may seem different from, and
fairer than, both its subjective alternative and the more explicitly pro-
plaintiff presumption previously described. By eliminating a fixed pre-
sumption, on the one hand, and the plaintiff's own necessarily predict-
able testimony on the other, and replacing them with an inquiry into the
hypothetical ex ante actions of a reasonable consumer, the objective ap-
proach might appear to offer factfinders a neutral way of resolving the
causation issue. For all practical purposes, however, its adoption would
not change or unravel the causation dilemma in any meaningful way.
The hypothetical reasonable person will always read and obey an
adequate warning label. The costs of doing so are minimal-a few min-
utes, at most, spent in the process of reading-and the benefits are enor-
mous-the avoidance of serious personal injury or property damage.
Reading and obeying warning labels, therefore, must define the activities
of the reasonable person, while failing to read or obey them must be a
sure sign of irrationality."' This truism would always end the causation
inquiry, perhaps more decisively in plaintiff's favor than either of the two
openly pro-plaintiff approaches. Consequently, if the current methods of
dealing with the causation issue seem problematic because they require
too little of the plaintiff, the adoption of an objective approach to causa-
tion would not seem to be the answer because it would require even less.
Since each of the possible approaches to causation has significant
weaknesses and no other satisfactory approach exists, failure-to-warn law
is left with a Hobson's choice of causation methodologies, doomed to
select one that does not function well. Of course, the need to choose
among poorly functioning legal principles is not unique to this area of
law, but again, it is made much more acute here, and much more harm-
ful, by the collapse of the "risk" and "adequacy" components of the doc-
trine. Because the emptiness of those components effectively removes
from warnings law the theoretical limitations on plaintiff's proof of duty
and breach, it might seem essential, in order to preserve the last shreds of
doctrinal integrity, that courts apply causation principles to limit the ease
164. In this respect, the causation issue in failure-to-warn cases differs critically from that
in informed consent cases. In the former type of case, it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which the application of the objective standard for causation would lead to the conclusion that
it was reasonable not to have read the warning label. In the latter type, however, the plaintiff's
cost-benefit calculus is very different and would sometimes lead the hypothetically reasonable
patient to proceed with the operation that ultimately turns out badly, even after having been
informed of all material risks.
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with which plaintiffs can make out a prima facie claim.16' By achieving
precisely the opposite result, however, the various approaches to proof of
causation amplify the impact of those other shortcomings and practically
ensure plaintiff's ultimate success at trial. Given the nature of this par-
ticular causation inquiry, and because there is no plausible pro-defendant
approach to causation in warnings law, no other outcome is possible. As
a result, failure-to-warn law, a doctrine meant to be clothed in negli-
gence, has assumed instead the garb of strict liability. The inevitable
consequences of causation methodology make this change of costume
complete. 166
VI. CURRENT CRITICISMS OF FAILURE-TO-WARN LAW
Recently, several prominent academicians have criticized failure-to-
warn law, pointing out many of the same problems discussed above. 167
165. Causation principles are not meant to serve this purpose, nor are they able, by them-
selves, to compensate fully for the other doctrinal distortions in failure-to-warn law. If they
are to be conscripted, however, to help in a struggle that was not of their making, rules of
causation should be used to rationalize existing doctrine, not to destabilize it further.
166. The two major dilemmas of usefully defining risk and adequacy, and of employing a
more restrictive concept of causation, by no means exhaust the list of significant doctrinal
problems that bedevil the law of failure-to-warn. A full discussion of all of those problems is
beyond the scope of this article; nevertheless, some deserve at least a passing mention.
Courts have long recognized two distinct kinds of duty to warn. The first kind, which
constitutes the main concern of this Article and is by far the more prolific source of litigation,
concerns the manufacturer's obligation at the point of sale and asks how much and what sort
of risk information need be on the product when the consumer buys it. The second kind,
alternately called the "post-sale" or "continuing" duty to warn, requires a manufacturer, who
discovers after its product has been marketed that the use of its product entails risks not men-
tioned in the existing warning label, to make "reasonable efforts" to issue post-sale warnings to
product users. See, eg., Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 176, 99 N.W.2d
627, 634 (1959) (having discovered defects in its cars' braking system after the cars had been
on the market, GM was obliged "to take all reasonable means to convey effective warning" to
the car buyers); see also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Airways Corp., 411 F.2d 451,
453 (2d Cir.) (holding that a manufacturer aware of "dangerous" defects in its product has
"continuing duty" to improve it and to give users "adequate" warning), cert denied, 396 U.S.
959 (1969). The practical difficulties associated with a continuing duty to warn, and the effi-
cacy of court-ordered product recall as an alternative to the arguable inefficiencies inherent in
a system of post-sale warning, have provided significant food for academic thought. See, e.g.,
Robert B. Patterson, Products Liability: The Manufacturer's Continuing Duty to Improve His
Product or Warn of Defects After Sale, 62 ILL. BAR J. 92, 93-98 (1973); Victor Schwartz, The
Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 895-97 (1983); Bernard W. Bell, Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to No-
tify of Subsequent Safety Improvements, 33 STAN. L. Rnv. 1087, 1093-99 (1981); Dale Car-
rington, Note, Bell Helicopter v. Bradshaw: The Existence of a Better System and a Duty to
Warn as a Basis for Product Liability Recovery, 22 S. TEx. L.J. 168, 170-75 (1982); Stanton A.
Shafer, Comment, Products Liability: Post-Sale Warnings, 1978 ARIz. ST. L.J. 49, 55, 64-68.
These problems still exist in large measure and add to the complexity and confusion of current
failure-to-warn doctrine.
167. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13 (summarizing warning
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While some of those criticisms are insightful, their approaches to rehabil-
itating the doctrine share the same fundamental error. Each suffers from
the naive view that the existing doctrine can be fixed with a little tinker-
ing here and a few adjustments there. Each wrongly encourages courts
to keep their gaze fixed on the content of the terms "risk" and "ade-
quacy"; each wrongly suggests that with a few simple corrections to ju-
ridical eyesight, the fuzzy contours of those terms can be made clear and
comprehensible.
A. The Henderson-Twerski Critique
Professors Henderson and Twerski have engaged in a lengthy exam-
ination of the obvious danger rule, 168 first praising it for possessing enor-
mous potential for limiting and clarifying warnings law,169 but then
expressing amazement that so many courts seem unable to do in practice
what in theory appears simple to the authors: recognize "obviousness"
when one sees it.170 For reasons inexplicable to Henderson and Twerski,
the case digests "abound" with doctrinal anomalies, seemingly aberra-
tional opinions where judges have unaccountably failed to discern the
obviousness of a particular risk and wrongly permitted plaintiffs to pro-
ceed to trial. 171
The case reports teem with those so-called anomalies because courts
cannot reach universal agreement about what constitutes an "obvious"
risk. Professors Henderson and Twerski appear to recognize this fact, 1 72
but attribute it to an unreasoned willingness on the part of many courts
to allow "too many cases" to "make their way to juries."1 73 To remedy
this judicial failing, they urge simply that "the standard of obviousness
must rise"; 74 but they do not, because they cannot, propose any specific
suggestion for levitating that standard. Consequently, their solution to
the predicament produced by the collapse of the obvious danger rule is
simply an exhortation that courts try harder to recognize obviousness
problems and proposing guidelines for manufacturers in creating defenses to liability); Doctri-
nal Collapse, supra note 13 (outlining and discussing the problems attendant to failure-to-warn
law, including unknowable risks and strict liability, causation presumption when no adequate
warning is given, and lack of restraints on jury discretion).
168. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 280-85, 314-17.
169. Id. at 280 ("Perhaps more than any other aspect of warnings doctrine, this traditional
rule should help courts cull unworthy failure-to-warn claims from the worthy.").
170. Id at 284-85.
171. Id. at 317.
172. "Perhaps what has happened in failure-to-warn cases is that courts, uncharacteristi-
cally, have gone too far in imposing an open-ended duty to rescue." Id. at 311.
173. Id. at 316.
174. Id. at 317.
[Vol. 71
PRODUCT LIABILITY
when they see it and that they strive to see it in the same way. 175
Henderson and Twerski have an equally nebulous response to the
causation dilemma. Following an excellent discussion of the problems
that bedevil the causation inquiry in warnings cases, 176 they suggest that
courts should resolve those problems by abandoning the presumptions
and rules favoring plaintiffs and replacing them with "a more fact-inten-
sive approach."177 Regrettably but perhaps inevitably, Henderson and
Twerski fail to identify even one type of fact whose proof might improve
the current method of treating causation, and they neglect to articulate
any way in which their approach would mend the flaws in the status quo.
If courts discard the current pro-plaintiff presumptions and require
plaintiffs to testify about their likely responses to a hypothetically ade-
quate warning, the testimony on causation will still be predictable, and
the larger causation inquiry presumably expanded to consider those un-
named facts that Henderson and Twerski believe are now being over-
looked, will still present the practical difficulties described earlier in this
Article and recognized clearly by Henderson and Twerski themselves. 178
Finally, Henderson and Twerski recount some of the problems in-
trinsic to the various "adequacy" rules discussed earlier in this article.
They mention, for example, the ease with which courts apply risk-utility
analysis to justify and require additional warnings sought by plaintiffs. 179
They point out the difficulties in harnessing modern communications the-
ory to the service of failure-to-warn law.' 8° They further note the rela-
tive facility with which courts routinely decide that questions of warning
label format can properly be sent to the jury.'8 1
For these problems of adequacy, and for the other doctrinal compli-
cations as well, Henderson and Twerski recommend a three-pronged so-
lution. They suggest that courts "simply should refuse to hold
defendants liable for failing to include one more tiny piece of informa-
175. At the other end of the risk spectrum, Henderson and Twerski acknowledge that the
remoteness rule has even fewer teeth than its obviousness counterpart. Id. at 294 n.122
("Many more decisions deny liability for failure to warn as a matter of law on the ground that
the risk is obvious than do so on the ground that the risk is remote."). However, because they
think the obviousness rule can be rehabilitated by a collective act of judicial will, they do not
recognize that the inevitable failure of both rules destroys any possibility that failure-to-warn
doctrine might function effectively.
176. Id. at 303-10.
177. Id. at 326.
178. Id. at 306.
179. Id. at 293-95.
180. Id. at 297-99.
181. Id. at 309.
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tion" in their warnings. 182 They argue that courts must defer "more
readily to other decision-makers who do possess the institutional capabil-
ity to assess warnings as a whole."18s3  They also propose that courts
"demand greater procedural rigor in the litigation process, directing ver-
dicts more readily in unworthy cases." 1
84
Each of these proposals is ultimately unsatisfying. Consider the fi-
nal one first. Although Henderson and Twerski advocate the injection of
"greater procedural rigor in[to] the litigation process," they refrain com-
pletely from describing this "rigor," other than to refer to it obliquely as
"starch" and "tension."1 5 At the same time, they supply no clues that
could help solve the ultimate riddle of failure-to-warn: how to define an
adequate warning and distinguish it from an inadequate one. This pro-
posal, then, amounts to no more than academic cheerleading, the expres-
sion of an amorphous but well-meaning belief that courts can do better in
this area if they really, really try.
The second proposal, though somewhat more specific, also misses
the mark. In order to allow for systematic and expert consideration of
warning labels as a whole, Henderson and Twerski argue that courts
"could at least pay more serious attention" to the conclusions about
warning labels reached by federal agencies and commissions. 8 6 Again,
since they do not indicate how much more attention courts should pay to
these agencies, this proposal also lacks the kind of specificity that might
make it meaningful.1 87
182. Id. at 314.
183. Id. at 313.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 322.
186. Id at 320. Henderson and Twerski name the Food and Drug Administration and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission as two of the "product safety agencies" to which courts
should defer. Id. Their confidence in the F.D.A. as a lodestar of regulatory efficiency seems
sadly misplaced, particularly in light of the recent and heavy criticism leveled at that agency
for its failure to describe and regulate the risks associated with silicone-filled breast implants.
See From No Scrutiny to Federal Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at A18. Their trust in
the CPSC appears equally suspect. See, eg., Jean A. Langlois et al., The Impact of Speciic Toy
Warning Labels, 265 JAMA 2848-50 (June 5, 1991).
187. A number of states provide by statute that a manufacturer whose product warning
complies with state or federal laws or regulations shall benefit from a rebuttable presumption
that its warning is not defective. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (1977); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3304 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01.1 to -05(3) (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980). The Tennessee statute is
typical. It states that:
Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statute or adminis-
trative regulation existing at the time a product was manufactured and prescribing
standards for ... warning or instructions for use of a product, shall raise a rebuttable
presumption that the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in re-
gard to matters covered by these standards.
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Even if Henderson and Twerski could satisfactorily quantify the de-
sirable degree of judicial attention to agency rules, courts might with
good reason question the wisdom and efficacy of protecting consumer
interests by deferring to those rules. Over the past three decades, com-
mentators from all parts of the political and academic spectrum have
attacked the premise that the regulatory process can fairly and effectively
protect or enhance consumer welfare."'8 At the same time, the specific
federal regulations that govern warning labels for cigarettes," 9 alcoholic
Id.
Two well-known scholars have also argued that compliance with statutory or regulatory
warning requirements be deemed an absolute defense to liability. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at
110-12; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 398 n.90. Because very few of the millions of products sold
in this country are currently subject to any statutory or administrative warning requirement,
the scope of the statutory warning defense would be quite narrow. More importantly, how-
ever, reliance on that defense would entrust consumer safety to a cumbersome and inflexible
process largely dependent on Congressional financing and would lock in place a methodology
the historical efficacy of which is questionable.
188. Earlier in his career, Professor Twerski himself was a member of this large group of
critics. See Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 11.
Over the past 35 years, much of the work of federal regulatory agencies has come under
mounting criticism. Many commentators have attacked the performance of those agencies on
the grounds that the agencies have been "captured" by the very interests that they were sup-
posed to regulate and have consequently ignored the well-being of consumers, workers, and
other intended beneficiaries of the regulatory process. See, eg., ROBERT C. FELLMETH, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC vii-x (1970);
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 58-61 (1979); JAMES S. TURNER, THE CHEM-
ICAL FEAST 1-4 (1970); Mark J. Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation v. Competition:
Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 875-76 (1973). Others have argued that
current forms of regulatory intervention and efforts to reform it are inefficient. See, e.g., STE-
PHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. McAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 14-15 (1974); GEORGE G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN
REGULATION 167-77 (1975); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47, 48 (1969); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Economic Regulation vs Competition: Ralph
Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE L.J. 890, 891-94 (1973). Still others have claimed
that administrative agencies inevitably come to adopt the biases and orientation of the indus-
tries that they are charged with regulating. See, eg., Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 14 (1965); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative
Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1954).
189. Congress originally enacted cigarette warning legislation in 1965, see Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282-283 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340), and has amended that legislation twice since, first in
1970, see Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87-88
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340), and again in 1984, see Comprehensive Smok-
ing Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200, 2201-2202 (codified as
amended as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). The original legislation required cigarette packages to
bear the following statement: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health." Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282-283 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). The 1970 amendments re-
placed the original statement with the following language: "Warning: The Surgeon General
Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87-88 (codified as amended at 15
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beverages, 190 and toys containing small parts19 have all drawn serious
criticism from both legal and scientific commentators, 192 not only be-
cause they arguably fail to provide consumers with useful risk informa-
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). The 1984 amendments created a scheme requiring the following four
separate warning labels to appear, one at a time, in alternating sequence on cigarette packages:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Dis-
ease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.; SURGEON GENERAL'S
WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your
Health.; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.; SURGEON
GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-2202 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)).
190. The Alcohol Beverage Labeling Act of 1988 (ABLA) prohibits the manufacture, im-
portation, or bottling for sale or distribution in the United States, of any alcoholic beverage,
unless the beverage container carries the following statement: "GOVERNMENT WARN-
ING: (1) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages
during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages
impairs your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause health problems." 27
U.S.C. § 215 (1988).
191. In 1980 the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) promulgated its "small
parts" standard. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.18(a)(9), 1501 (1992). This standard applies to all toys
sold in interstate commerce, and effectively prohibits the manufacture and sale of toys to chil-
dren below the age of three, if the toys themselves or any of their detachable components meet
the statutory definition of "small parts," a term defined by reference to specific measurements.
Toys containing small parts can be lawfully sold provided that they are not marketed to chil-
dren under the age of three. In order to comply with this standard, toy manufacturers gener-
ally place age labels on the packaging of their products, though they are not required to do so
by the CPSC. The CPSC does, however, provide toy manufacturers with guidelines for age
labeling that direct the manufacturers to consider developmental appropriateness and safety in
recommending a particular toy for a particular age group of children. See Langlois et al.,
supra note 186, at 2848-50.
192. For academic commentary that criticizes both the content of the warnings required on
cigarette packages and the judicial opinions finding that those warnings preempt state law tort
actions alleging inadequacy of warning, see Robert C. Carlsen, Comment, Common Law
Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette
Labelling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cippolone v. Ligett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
754, 769 (1986); Brendan K. Collins, Note, Products Liability-The Federal Cigarette Label-
ling and Advertising Act Preempts State Common-Law Damage Actions Challenging Either the
Adequacy of the Act's Warnings or the Propriety of the Advertising Practices of a Cigarette
Manufacturer That Has Complied with the Act: Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 32 VILL. L,
REv. 875, 892 (1987).
For legal scholarship that questions the informational and scientific efficacy of the warn-
ing labels required by the Alcohol Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, as well as the harmful
prospects created by that Act's probable preemptive effect, see Michael S. Jacobs, The Alcohol
Beverage Labeling Act of 1988: A Critical Analysis, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1223, 1231-36
(1989). Although the ABLA's warning scheme has been in effect for only two years, some
members of Congress already deem it inadequate and have recently proposed legislation that
would require alcohol-related advertising to alternate one of five separate warning statements.
See Philip J. Hitts, Alcohol Ads Criticized as Appealing to Children, N.Y. TIMES, November 5,
1991, at A16.
For an empirical study that casts significant doubt on the utility and intelligibility to toy
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tion, but also because preemption clauses in some federal warning
legislation 93 probably serve to insulate the statutory warnings from state
court attack, freezing in place warning formats that may be untested and
warning language that may be ill-considered, outdated, or ambiguous.1 94
For these reasons, proposals to fix warnings law by entrusting its care to
the unwieldy, ineffective, and possibly preemptive processes of federal
regulatory agencies not only cut directly against the grain of modem aca-
demic wisdom but threaten as well to cause more harm than good.19
buyers of the Consumer Product Safety Commission's small parts standard for toys with small
parts, see Langlois et al., supra note 186, at 2348-50.
193. The preemption section of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988), whose warning requirements are set forth supra note 189, reads as
follows:
Section 1334. Preemption
(a) Additional Statements. No statement relating to smoking and health, other
than the statement required by section 1333 of this title [the warning label], shall be
required on any cigarette package.
(b) State Regulations. No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions
of this chapter.
Id. § 1334.
Section 216 of the Alcohol Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, whose warning requirements
are set forth supra at note 190, provides:
No statement relating to alcoholic beverages and health, other than the state-
ment required by section 215 of this title [the warning label], shall be required under
State law to be placed on any container of an alcoholic beverage or on any box,
carton, or other package, irrespective of the material from which made, that contains
such a container.
27 U.S.C. § 216 (1988).
194. See Jacobs, supra note 192, at 1236-1249. Because of the likely preemptive effect of
the ABLA on state court actions alleging the inadequacy of warning labels, the dilemmas
posed by cases such as Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385 (1991),
discussed supra at notes 51-61 and accompanying text, and others alleging failure to warn
about the risks of consuming alcoholic beverages, have probably been mooted, at least as of
November 18, 1989, the effective date of the warning label requirements contained in the fed-
eral legislation. 27 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1988).
195. In one of his earlier articles, Professor Twerski advocated an approach to agency-
made product standards that is much more cautious than the one that he now proposes. In
discussing whether courts should defer in products liability cases to standards promulgated by
the then newly-established Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Professor Twerski
and his co-authors criticized the lack in the CPSC statutory framework of a formalized
method for assuring consumer input to the regulatory process and argued that:
Given the context of this statutory framework, it is not at all clear that independent
evaluation by the courts within the context of the private lawsuit is undesirable.
When one adds the tendency of administrative agencies to develop an industry orien-
tation with the passage of time, the argument for an independent forum to examine
standards is a potent one.
Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 11, at 537.
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The traditional judicial approach to manufacturer compliance with
agency-made warnings, that it constitutes some evidence of care but not
conclusive evidence, 196 should be left alone.1 97
Henderson and Twerski's first proposal is no better than their other
two and, because it ignores what is one of the major problem of warnings
law, is probably worse. By urging courts to refuse to hold manufacturers
liable for failing to add "insignificant increments" to their warning la-
bels,19 Henderson and Twerski encourage courts to act in precisely the
way that courts probably believe they are acting now. The quandary of
warnings law does not stem from a judicial proclivity to demand addi-
tional insignificant bits of information. Rather, the law has become mys-
terious because, by defining almost all risk information as significant,
courts have left themselves with no reasoned basis for permitting manu-
facturers to exclude any risk information from warning labels. 199 By en-
couraging continued judicial emphasis on the content of warning labels,
Henderson and Twerski's proposal would further obscure this mystery,
not illuminate it.
B. The Reporters' Study to the American Law Institute
The other major academic effort recently to analyze warnings law
suffers from many of the same shortcomings found in the Henderson-
Twerski work. The Reporters' Study to the American Law Institute, enti-
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965); MODEL UNIFORM PRODS.
LIAB. AcT § 108 (1979).
197. The Henderson-Twerski "deference to experts" proposal actually has three parts. The
second part urges courts to accord "some" weight to industry standards regarding product
warnings and, particularly, to give "substantial weight" to evidence that an entire industry "or
a substantial portion thereof" has adopted specific customs pertaining to warning labels. Doc-
trinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 322. This proposal suffers from the same problems of ambi-
guity (how much is "some"?) and of institutional competence (why defer to an industry
custom that might not be demonstrably intelligent?) that characterize the first part of their
proposal. Cf. The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) ("[A]
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.... Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their uni-
versal disregard will not excuse their omission.") (Hand, J., delivering the opinion of the
court), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
The third part is somewhat schizophrenic. Acknowledging that the role of expert wit-
nesses in products liability litigation has recently come under heavy attack, see, e.g., Chaulk v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 643-45 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting), and
realizing explicitly that their own analysis suggests "that expert testimony can be extremely
problematic in the failure-to-warn context," Henderson and Twerski nevertheless contend that
experts can serve the useful purpose of educating the courts about the "truly difficult policy
choices" in failure-to-warn litigation. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 324-25.
198. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 313.
199. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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tled "Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, '' 2°1 was published in
the spring of 1991. It briefly summarizes, among other things, some of
the problems of warnings law2"1 and sets forth five "Policy Proposals"
intended "to define and establish safe harbors for potential defend-
ants. ' 2°2 First, the Reporters' Study says, the law should retain the cur-
rent rules requiring manufacturers to warn of "residual" dangers posed
by well-made products and exculpating those manufacturers from liabil-
ity when their warnings are adequate.203 Second, it proposes that a man-
ufacturer's "[c]ompliance with specific government regulations
respecting the form and content of product warnings" be exculpatory. 2 4
Third, it contemplates that in evaluating the adequacy of particular
warnings, courts should encourage the use of expert testimony and defer
more readily to warnings "created in accordance with what are widely
regarded as effective communicative techniques. '20 ' Fourth, it argues
that the federal government should create a "uniform national vocabu-
lary" for information regarding risk levels.206 Finally, it asserts that once
the manufacturer's duty to warn has been reshaped in the manner sug-
gested by the previous four proposals, in those cases where a warning is
judged inadequate, courts should adopt an explicitly pro-plaintiff pre-
sumption as to causation.20 7
A number of these proposals closely track parts of the Henderson-
Twerski thesis and for that reason will not be re-examined here. For
example, in support of its suggestion that courts should encourage the
use of expert testimony to evaluate warning adequacy and should defer
more willingly to industry practice that employs "what are widely re-
garded as effective communicative techniques," the Reporters' Study ex-
plicitly cites the Henderson-Twerski argument criticized earlier in this
Article. 2 1 It repeats in stronger form the Henderson-Twerski argument
200. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13.
201. Id. at 70.
202. Id.
203. Id. Remarkably, the Report neglects to define the word "residual," even though that
term is foreign to warnings discourse, and even though its ordinary meaning-"remaining" or
"left over"-does not fit comfortably into the traditional vocabulary of warnings law. See
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, supra note 40, at 142.
204. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 72.
205. Id. at 74.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 77.
208. See id. at 74. For the criticism of the Henderson-Twerski position, see supra notes
168-99 and accompanying text. The optimism expressed both by the Reporters' Study and by
the Henderson-Twerski article about the use of expert testimony at trial is misplaced. Both
sets of authors seem to envision matched pairs of experts testifying to judges or lay juries about
the content of the warning in question: did the manufacturer describe the "right" set of risks,
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that courts should pay "more serious attention" to warning regulations
established by administrative agencies.2oo It also reiterates the theoreti-
cal underpinning of the Henderson-Twerski analysis: the problems of
defining "obvious" and "remote" dangers, and of rationalizing a content-
based approach to "adequacy," are not insurmountable, but can instead
be overcome in a way that would allow the traditional doctrine to oper-
ate smoothly.210
Two of the proposals in the Reporters' Study differ significantly from
those of Henderson and Twerski. One champions the development by
the federal government of a "uniform national vocabulary" for commu-
nicating risk information and the exemption from liability of any product
warning that makes "appropriate" use of this vocabulary. 1 The other
urges all courts to utilize an openly pro-plaintiff presumption to resolve
questions of causation.212
Although in some ways it differs significantly from the Henderson-
Twerski position, the approach of the Reporters' Study to the causation
issue does not merit extended discussion here. As mentioned earlier,213
all of the approaches to causation pose problems, and none can remove
the inevitably pro-plaintiff tinge of the inquiry. Since the critical difficul-
ties with warnings law flow from the practical absence of any real limits
to its "risk" and "adequacy" rules, the choice of an approach to causa-
tion is irrelevant because causation methodology is incapable by itself of
erecting any meaningful limitations on the scope of those rules.
Developing a national vocabulary of risk information is much easier
to propose than to accomplish. Some private groups have tried to de-
velop small vocabularies of warning. The American National Standards
Institute, for instance, has published guidelines for manufacturers of
products that pose mechanical hazards, using words such as "danger,"
use the "right" words for the "appropriate" audience and frame it all in the "right" format?
This kind of testimony is not only highly predictable but is also highly likely to confuse, rather
than to assist, the average jury.
209. The Reporters' Study proposes that manufacturer compliance with government regu-
lations respecting the form and content of warnings be "exculpatory." AMERICAN LAW IN-
sTrrUmTE, supra note 13, at 72. While this stance certainly eliminates the definitional ambiguity
found in the Henderson-Twerski position (regarding what constitutes "serious" consideration
on the part of courts), it places consumers too much at the mercy of the administrative pro-
cess, a process which is dependent for its success upon Executive and Congressional funding
priorities and which has already failed the consumer in a number of glaring ways. See supra
text accompanying notes 186-95.
210. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 70-72.
211. Id. at 74.
212. Id
213. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text.
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"warning," and "caution" to denote different levels of risk.214 But these
proto-efforts have drawn criticism, even from authors who generally
favor the development of risk vocabularies, on the ground that they are
not based on "formal scientific studies of labeling efficacy. ' 215 No one
who advocates the adoption of such vocabularies seems to believe that it
can be done easily. Moreover, if the federal government were to develop
such a vocabulary, it would almost certainly delegate that task to one or
more of the same administrative agencies whose performances thus far in
the warning label area arguably leave a great deal to be desired.2 16 Even
if those agencies could manage somehow to construct a potentially useful
vocabulary of risk,2 17 effectively teaching it to all consumers would be
tremendously difficult. For all of these reasons, linking the future of
warnings law to the federal government's adoption of a national vocabu-
lary of risk information seems neither a good nor a practical idea.2" 8
C. The Fundamental Shortcoming of Recent Scholarship
While the specific weaknesses in the Reporters' Study and the Hen-
derson-Twerski article significantly undermine the force of their insights,
of greater consequence than any particular analytic flaw is the misdi-
rected perspective of each analysis. Because both view warnings law
from the vantage of the traditional content or substance-based approach,
neither realizes that the major obstacle to doctrinal coherence resides in
that very approach.
A content-based analysis of product warnings encourages, and even
requires, the detailed inspection of every aspect of the critical elements of
214. See Voluntary Rule for Product Warnings Approved by National Standards Institute,
19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) at 818-19 (July 19, 1991).
215. See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 145 (1991).
216. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. Recently, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration proposed new regulations for labeling food products that would define words such as
"light," "low-fat," "reduced," and "fresh," terms that have historically been used loosely by
some manufacturers and deceptively by others. The agency will publish a final version of the
regulations within a year; and the final regulations will likely become effective in two years.
The proposed regulations fill a 2000 page document. See Molly O'Neill, New Rules on Label-
ing May Change Foods, Too, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1991, at Cl. It remains to be seen, of
course, whether and to what extent consumers will learn the new vocabulary of food. But
because that vocabulary deals with terms that are common to many food products, that are
quantifiable, and whose meaning does not depend on either consumer experience or variations
in patterns of consumer usage, it will undoubtedly be easier both to formulate and to under-
stand than a comparable vocabulary for risk.
217. Or several such vocabularies, if the need to speak to audiences with different levels of
product expertise and critically different backgrounds is as acute as earlier discussion sug-
gested it might be. See supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
218. This discussion ignores the distinct but secondary problem created by this proposal:
determining what constitutes the "appropriate" use of any such vocabulary.
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"relevant risk" and "adequate warning." Using that analysis, courts now
scrutinize each product hazard that results in a lawsuit to decide whether
it should pass through the virtually non-existent filters formed in theory
by the rules of obvious and remote danger.219 Because, not surprisingly,
almost all claims succeed in escaping elimination at that stage of the pro-
cess, courts then inspect each warning label microscopically to determine
whether its particular wording, syntax, and style pass legal muster.
Every risk, word, type size, and minute detail of every warning label is
subject to intense judicial scrutiny.
Given this technique, which is at once heavily fact-dependent and
deeply reliant on fact finders uninformed about both the science of risk
and the science of communication, the resulting array of inconsistent and
unreasoned decisions should come as no surprise.22 0 Since courts and
juries lack the expertise to distinguish meaningfully among categories of
risk or different styles and formats of warning labels, they are forced to
draw their own necessarily idiosyncratic lines around the indeterminate
concepts of "obvious," "remote," and "adequate" and to search without
guidance for the "relevant" middle ground. No wonder then that, in the
absence of articulable standards, different courts and juries have sketched
radically different boundaries around the notions of "relevant risk" and
"adequacy."
The Henderson-Twerski article and, to a lesser extent, the Reporters'
Study both advance the same flawed solution to these problems. Con-
tinue to focus mostly, if not entirely, on the content of the warnings, they
argue, but get the focus right. Define "obviousness" and "remoteness" in
a workable fashion.22  Eliminate222 or adopt 223 a pro-plaintiff presump-
tion regarding causation. Disregard "minor differences" in the wording
or format of warning labels.224 Inject "procedural rigor" into the trial of
these cases.225 Have experts on both sides testify about the obviousness
of the risk and the sufficiency of the warning.22 6 But above all, retain the
current, substance-based inquiry and continue to examine word by word
the content of each warning label.
These suggestions represent the triumph of hope over experience.
Differences of opinion about all the key terms in warnings law are intrac-
219. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
221. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 314, 317.
222. Id. at 326.
223. AMERICAN LAW INSnTuTE, supra note 13, at 77.
224. Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 319.
225. Id. at 322.
226. Id. at 324; AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, supra note 13, at 74.
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table. Altering the precise type of causation method used in these cases
will not do much to reduce judicial or jury discretion. Exhorting courts
to disregard "minor differences" in format neglects to tell them which
differences are "minor" and which are not. Cheering for greater proce-
dural rigor is a vacuous exercise; welcoming experts on both sides to do
battle in court over hotly contested scientific theories seems as likely to
confuse the inquiry further as to clarify it.
The Reporters' Study and the Henderson-Twerski article both criti-
cize the tremendous growth in the number of failure-to-warn cases and
question the success of claims which they consider factually problematic.
But the content-based approach that they advocate, an approach un-
marked by workable limits to the critical concepts of risk and adequacy,
naturally leads almost all courts to dissect each warning label, risk by
risk and word by word, evaluating everything, but defining nothing.
VII. A TENTATIVE PROCESS-BASED APPROACH TO WARNINGS LAW
A. A Hypothetical Model
Because the content-based approach to warnings law has failed,
courts need to replace their minute inquiries into the details of risk and
adequacy with a method of analysis that focuses on the procedures used
by the manufacturer prior to the adoption and publication of its warning
information. If those procedures are scientifically valid, courts should
adopt a rebuttable presumption that the ensuing warning label is ade-
quate as a matter of law. If a manufacturer fails to employ such proce-
dures, however, courts should employ a rebuttable presumption that its
warning is legally inadequate.
There undoubtedly is more than one method of implementing suc-
cessfully a procedural approach to failure-to-warn law. The sample
methodology proposed below is meant not only to give content to this
argument and to demonstrate its feasibility, but also to encourage the
development of other, better methods.
Ideally, warning methodology would borrow heavily from five re-
lated fields: marketing, industrial design, injury prevention, communica-
tions, and focus group research. Almost all corporations that
manufacture and sell consumer goods employ relatively sophisticated
survey and interview techniques to determine which groups of consumers
might buy their products and which groups do in fact buy them.227 The
227. According to one textbook about product marketing, contemporar marketing strat-
egy involves a number of different elements: segmentation, product, promotion, pricing, and
distribution. See J. PAUL PETER & JERRY C. OLSON, CONSUMER AND MARKETING STRAT-
EGY 11 (2d ed. 1990). Segmentation, the element most relevant to a pre-publication process
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information obtained from these techniques usually forms the basis for
advertising campaigns.228 Manufacturers could easily use that marketing
information to identify specifically the audience to whom their risk infor-
mation must be directed.2 29
Having utilized basic marketing techniques to target consumers at
risk, manufacturers might then ask in-house research and design person-
nel, outside engineering and injury prevention experts, and consumer fo-
cus groups230 to explore the ranges of product use, in order to learn
about those risks most likely to harm product users and most likely to
for warning labels, asks which consumers are the prime prospects for the product in question
and explores which particular consumer characteristics might be of greatest interest to the
manufacturer. Id. at 402. Companies can choose from or among many potential "segmenta-
tion bases" for consumer markets, including the "geographic" (by region, size of locality, cli-
mate, and population density), "demographic" (by age, sex, family size, income, occupation,
education, religion, race, nationality), "psychosocial" (by social class, lifestyle, and personal-
ity), and "cognitive, affective, and behavioral" (by attitudes, benefits sought, readiness stage,
perceived risk, usage rate, and others). Id at 402, 406-07; see also Robert L. Burr, Market
Segments and Other Revelations, 4 . CONSUMER MARKETING 51 (1987) (describing segmenta-
tions and target marketing of Prudential Insurance Company); Valarie A. Zeithaml, The New
Demographics and Market Fragmentation, 49 . MARKETING 64 (1985) (discussing how
changing demographics and family roles may affect retailers and manufacturers).
228. For a discussion of the relationship between marketing and advertising strategies, see
PETER & OLSON, supra note 227, at 478-85.
229. Knowing one's consumers is certainly useful for purposes of drafting meaningful
product warnings, but not so useful as knowing which subcategories of one's consumers are
more likely to be injured by one's product. Presumably, warnings specifically targeted at high-
risk consumers are more likely to reduce injury than warnings directed at consumers in gen-
eral. Beginning in 1972, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has collected data
about product-related injuries, pursuant to a program known as the National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS). Using a statistical sample of hospital-based emergency depart-
ments, NEISS gathers relatively detailed reports about patients treated in the participating
emergency departments, reports that name the product or products involved in the injury, and
reports that describe specifically the injury itself and the relevant personal characteristics of
the injured consumer. The CPSC then makes this data available to the public in various com-
puter formats, under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. See National Electronic
Surveillance System, NEISS Data Highlights, 5 DIRECTORATE FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1-4
(1982). The promise of this program, and the quality and quantity of the information that it
gathers, have been significantly compromised in the past several years by severe Reagan-era
budget cuts and staff reductions at the CPSC. See, eg., Molly Sinclair, Inside: Consumer
Product Safety Commission, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1983, at A17.
230. Focus groups, also called group depth interviews, are among "the most widely used
research tools in the social sciences." DAVID W. STEWART & PREM N. SHAMDASANI, Focus
GROUPS 9 (1990). Originally developed to evaluate audience response to radio programs, this
interviewing technique, as its name implies, attempts to probe deeply into topics of research
interest, by using a trained interviewer to direct and stimulate group discussion about those
topics. The focus group interview usually involves eight to twelve people who discuss a partic-
ular topic under the direction of a trained moderator who promotes interaction among group
members and assures that the discussion remains focused on the topic of interest. Id. at 10.
Among the more common uses of focus groups are:
1. obtaining general background information about a topic of interest;
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harm them seriously. Of course, no process can uncover every risk asso-
ciated with product use, but the combination of in-house research, in-
dependent engineering expertise, injury prevention advice, and relevant
consumer feedback offers the promising possibility that most of the risk
territory will be canvassed.
Armed with data describing its target audiences and with a roster of
relevant risks, the prudent manufacturer should next consult experts in
communications science to develop appropriate wording and an adequate
format for its warning label . 31 Among other things, those experts
should consider the number of risks to be mentioned, the location of the
warning label, the best language to use for the target audience, the cor-
rect degree of urgency, and any other scientifically-relevant matters.
Again, experts in communications science may disagree over matters of
warning label content, style, and format, but the fact of professional disa-
greement should not by itself invalidate an honest choice among reason-
able alternatives.
With this accomplished, and before sending its final warning label
into the world, the manufacturer should develop a prototypical label, an
experimental model incorporating its preliminary research. That model
should then be tested on focus groups of identified consumers for all of
the factors of wording, style, and syntax determined relevant by the com-
munications experts. Ideally, focus group members would be asked to
use the product for some period of time, thus enabling them to assess the
match between the actual risks of product use and the risk information
2. generating research hypotheses that can be submitted to further research and
testing using more quantitative approaches;
3. stimulating new ideas and creative concepts;
4. diagnosing the potential for problems with a new program, service, or product;
5. generating impressions of products, programs, services, institutions, or other ob-
jects of interest;
6. learning how respondents talk about the phenomenon of interest. This, in turn,
may facilitate the design of questionnaires, survey instruments, or other research
tools that might be employed in more quantitative research; and
7. interpreting previously obtained quantitative results.
Id. at 15.
While focus groups are not meant to replace all other forms of social research, they are
recognized as having a number of advantages over other methods. In particular, they are
"very flexible" and can be used to examine a variety of topics with a variety of people in a
variety of settings. Id. at 16. They are also "one of the few research tools available for ob-
taining data from children or from individuals who are not particularly literate," a factor of
great relevance to the efficacy of product warning labels. Id. Furthermore, the results of focus
group research are easy to understand. Id.
231. For a good basic description of the field of communications science and an excellent
discussion of the ways in which the theory and practice of that science can be incorporated
into the drafting of product warnings, see Schwartz & Driver, supra note 11, at 46-50.
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contained on the label. If the testing process reveals consumer misunder-
standing over the meaning of the label, or demonstrates that the warning
information does not match actual product use, the prototype should be
modified and tested again, until the manufacturer develops a version that
passes muster with the focus group. Finally, to ensure that existing
warning labels remain adequate, manufacturers and their communica-
tions experts should periodically test their products on new focus groups
to determine whether the warning's original efficacy has been under-
mined by product uses not originally foreseen by the manufacturer, or by
significant changes in the composition of the consumer group.
If manufacturers follow this procedure, their warning labels should
be presumed adequate as a matter of law. Courts should refrain from
second-guessing a scientifically acceptable process: if the process is suffi-
cient, courts should not dissect its outcome, but should instead validate it
and spare themselves the need to wrestle with the intractable dilemmas
of traditional failure-to-warn doctrine. If manufacturers choose not to
adopt such a procedure for developing warnings, courts should subject
their warnings to an opposite and rebuttable presumption of inadequacy.
This matched set of presumptions would serve the interests of all the
major actors in the failure-to-warn drama. By encouraging the use of
scientifically validated procedures, courts would finally be describing for
manufacturers in one of the clearest ways possible a method by which
they can avoid liability. Since liability under current warnings law often
seems to come randomly and almost always carries with it a large price
tag, manufacturers should be quite willing to incur the costs associated
with a pre-publication process in exchange for the security provided by
the presumption of adequacy.
A procedural approach would also benefit consumers. While some
individual consumers, who might have won damage awards under the
current lottery system, will lose if the procedural methodology advocated
above is adopted, the majority of consumers would receive higher quality
risk information, whose efficacy and intelligibility would have passed the
test of consumer focus groups, and whose continuing utility would
largely be assured by periodic re-examination. To the extent that tort
law seeks to deter personal injury,232 a doctrine that encourages manu-
232. For scholars in the law and economics movement, tort mechanisms are judged largely
by the extent to which they efficiently promote the deterrence of costly outcomes. See, e.g.,
GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COsTs OF ACCIDENTS 16 (1970); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 856-64 (1981); Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudi-
cation, 8 HoFmSTA L. REv. 487, 502-03 (1980). Other writers, less convinced that the rules of
tort law usually provoke rational deterrent responses by those affected, argue that the goal of
compensation should predominate contemporary thinking about tort reform. See, e.g., How-
[Vol. 71
PRODUCT LIABILITY
facturers to spend their dollars and energy effectively to avoid product-
related harms is far better suited to consumer interests than one which
compensates some consumers generously after the fact, but which does
little beforehand to reduce product risk for all consumers.
Finally, a procedural approach would relieve the courts of the cur-
rent necessity, imposed upon them by the flaws in existing law, of at-
tempting to apply in a principled fashion an essentially unprincipled
method of decision-making. In particular, courts could eschew the inevi-
tably frustrating inquiries into the nature of each risk and the wording of
every warning label and replace them with the simpler, more determinate
examination required by the procedural approach. With that approach,
outcomes in failure-to-warn cases would generally become more predict-
able, more consistent and more rational; substantial amounts of judicial
time and energy would be saved. A doctrine that can be neither de-
fended nor applied well would be replaced by one that is both logically
defensible and capable of fair application.
Moreover, since a process-based methodology would not require
manufacturers to conform to any particular procedural orthodoxy, com-
panies would be free to devise their own effective approaches, to borrow
all or parts of the useful approaches of competitors or governmental
agencies, and to adjust their approaches over time, as new information or
new technology might require. This flexibility is desirable not only in its
own right, but especially as a counterpoise to the historical rigidity of the
processes that characterize the activities of administrative agencies in the
product warning field.233 Further, since investment in pre-publication
warning processes will usually be economically efficient, 3 " manufactur-
ers will almost always have clear incentives to spend money to improve
those processes. Governmental agencies, by contrast, do not control the
size of their budgets and are often unable, both for political and financial
reasons, to devote funds continuously to warning label research and
investigation.
To realize the benefits of this approach, manufacturers would need
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they did in fact utilize
a scientifically valid pre-publication process. For a number of reasons,
proof of this fact should come in documentary form. Documents that
describe the details of their procedures will best enable manufacturers to
ard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677,
742 (1985); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 591-94
(1985).
233. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
234. That is, simply stated, the projected savings in liability avoided will exceed the costs of
warning label development.
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demonstrate the validity of their warning process, permit courts to decide
questions of procedural validity more easily, provide plaintiffs with some-
thing tangible to challenge, and through normal channels of discovery
and dissemination, help to educate other manufacturers about the state
of this particular art.
Manufacturers may fear that publicly documenting their warning
procedures will allow competitors to use them free of charge, but these
fears can be addressed.23 Trade secret laws can protect proprietary
processes of design and manufacture. 36 The disclosure of warnings-re-
lated procedural information, however, will serve important public inter-
ests not implicated by trade secret laws. Furthermore, manufacturers
will receive in exchange for their disclosures the benefit of presumptive
legality that the procedural approach permits.
To be sure, a procedural approach to warnings law cannot repair
every leak in the traditional system. Some gnawing problems will re-
main. In particular, it is difficult to imagine a pre-publication process
that would offer a good solution to the dilemma of drafting warning in-
formation intelligible to the illiterate and the non-English reading, when
those groups do not constitute a majority, or a significant minority, of the
consumer group for the product in question. Some help could come in
the form of appropriately informative warning and instructional tape re-
cordings, in English and in other languages, produced after a process
similar to that suggested above for written product warnings, enclosed
with a product in its original packaging. Admittedly, the utility of these
tapes would be limited. Some consumers, for reasons of cost or other-
wise, would have no access to tape players; others, who own tape players,
would find the tape-playing process sufficiently burdensome to forego the
235. To the extent that these fears prompt manufacturers to alter their documents in order
to deceive courts or competitors about either the thoroughness or the efficacy of their warning
process, they will defeat the goals of the procedural approach. However, comparable fears,
such as the fear of losing a trial on the merits that manufacturers currently may face under the
substantive approach, might conceivably motivate them-and other litigants for that matter-
to tamper with documents that have been sought as part of the discovery process, or at some
other stage of litigation, but this kind of theoretical reaction to fear does not seem to have
occurred much in practice.
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The Restatement notes that a
holder of a trade secret is entitled to have it protected from misappropriation. Id. The Re-
statement defines a trade secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competi-
tors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a
process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or
other devices, or a list of customers.
Id. § 757 cmt. b.
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use of the tape. However, in the workplace recorded warnings could
have considerable value if employers incorporated them into training and
orientation programs and otherwise made them readily accessible to
workers not literate in English.237
Other well-established principles of tort law might provide some
guidance for resolving these problems. Employers of illiterate workers,
for example, could perhaps be deemed more frequently to constitute
"learned or informed intermediaries"23 for those employees, so that in
certain circumstances a procedural analysis might oblige manufacturers
to demonstrate a pre-publication process directed at employers who
would bear the responsibility of explaining the warning information to
their workers.239 Non-English readers injured by products whose warn-
237. At bottom, the problem of providing useful information about product risks to people
not literate in English transcends the smaller world of products liability and poses broad cul-
tural and political questions about the nature of effective communication in a multilingual
society. Courts are not the only institutions with an interest in those questions, nor are they
particularly well suited to resolve them. And though it would be terribly unfair to permit
manufacturers who sell to all to ignore the informational needs of the non-English speaking, it
would be equally unwise to use the courts as a testing ground for communication methodolo-
gies whose technology is unproven and whose political and cultural wisdom is debatable. Cf
Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. RFv. 321, 330-39, 350-
53, 357-60 (1987) (describing the acrimony and the complexity of issues that result from liti-
gating bilingual education suits).
238. The learned-intermediary doctrine is a judge-made rule developed to ameliorate cer-
tain practical warning problems confronting the manufacturers of prescription drugs. Thus,
while those manufacturers have traditionally had a duty to warn about the dangerous side
effects and risks associated with the use of their products, see, eg., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270
Or. 375, 385-90, 528 P.2d 522, 528-30 (1974), in many jurisdictions manufacturers can satisfy
that duty by providing the requisite warning to the prescribing physician alone, see, eg., Hoff-
man v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 1973); McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal
Co., 453 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1972), and can properly assume that since the patient/
consumer cannot obtain prescription drugs without the physician's authorization, the in-
formed physician will have an opportunity to describe to the patient, in a manner presumably
geared to the patient's level of comprehension, the risks attendant upon the use of the manu-
facturer's product. See Polley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 658 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D. Alaska 1987).
One way of describing the operating assumption of the learned intermediary doctrine
would suggest that when the ultimate user of a product can obtain it only through some third
person the product's manufacturer can lawfully direct its warning to that third person and rely
on that party's fiduciary or other duties to insure that the ultimate consumer receives the
necessary warning information. Many employees gain access to the products that they use at
work solely by virtue of their employment. Since employers are required to provide their em-
ployees with a safe workplace, see Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1988), and can or should be institutionally capable of understanding product
warnings and communicating them to their workers, the learned intermediary doctrine could
arguably apply, without too much strain, to require employers to advise their illiterate employ-
ees of the risks of using products supplied or made available to them in connection with their
work.
239. The process-based approach might require, for example, that manufacturers, in con-
ducting their marketing analyses, research the composition and literacy levels of the
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ing labels are written only in English might properly be regarded as con-
tributorily or comparatively negligent' for having undertaken an
activity the risks of which they did not fully understand. But both of
these solutions are unsatisfying, legally as well as politically. The former,
by replacing a manufacturer's duty with an employer's, would remit to
the confined world of workers' compensation law241 a type of claim that
previously had been unconstrained by damage schedules, while the latter
would result in the grim prospect of offering to disadvantaged groups
fewer of the protections afforded by the law to more favored segments of
the population.242
Indeed, the procedural approach encounters problems when the
consumer group for a particular product is diverse. Assuming that its
warning label might need to alert different user groups to different risks,
and given the physical and scientific constraints on warning label size,
workforce of their employer-customers and work with those customers to develop programs
that explain product risks directly to the employees. For an interesting discussion of how, in
certain circumstances, the "learned intermediary" doctrine might require a chain of warnings,
stretching from the manufacturer to groups of more sophisticated users, and from those groups
to others having little or no experience with the product in question, see Kenneth M. Willner,
Note, Failures To Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 590-96
(1988).
240. Contributory negligence is generally defined as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra
note 91, § 65, at 451. Unlike contributory negligence, which acts as a complete bar to plain-
tiff's recovery, comparative negligence assigns relative degrees of fault to all plaintiffs and
defendants, and then apportions damages on the basis of the relative distribution of fault. Id.
§ 67, at 470-77.
241. In all states, workers' compensation laws provide to employees injured in the course of
their employment an exclusive statutory remedy against their employers, pursuant to a scheme
that first categorizes injuries (temporary partial, temporary total, permanent partial, and per-
manent total) and then establishes schedules of compensation levels appropriate for each type
of injury. See IC ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 58 (1992);
2 LARSON, supra, at §§ 59-60; 4 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION app. B, tables 8, 9, 16 (1990).
242. The potential incentives that these solutions create are of dubious utility. They "tell"
illiterates, for example, to learn to read, a message that has doubtless been sent before, and
whose reiteration does nothing to facilitate the task of learning to read. At bottom, the estab-
lishment of universal literacy seems more a governmental obligation than a private one. Using
the tort system to induce illiterates to learn to read probably sends a message that is not only
redundant but that is frustrating as well, since for many illiterates there may be no practical
way to achieve literacy. For the non-English reading, the judicial message strongly encourages
literacy in English. While this is doubtless a useful skill for residents of this country, to compel
its adoption through the tort system runs a serious risk of tampering with delicate political and
cultural questions about ethnic identity, cultural heritage, and linguistic preservation that are
perhaps best resolved in other institutional arenas. For a provocative discussion of the issues
of power, politics, and culture raised over the past 20 years in the conflict between the "Eng-
lish only" movement and groups favoring bilingual education, see Moran, supra note 237, at
326-33, 339-41.
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should the manufacturer direct the warning to a hypothetical "average"
consumer or to the largest subgroup of consumers? These kinds of
problems are truly intractable, not just for a process-based methodology
but for any approach to warnings law. Faced with this dilemma, the
current content-based approach almost always decides that the manufac-
turer should have added more risk information to its warning, but never
decides-never can decide-when this process of addition should stop.243
A procedural approach to this problem would presumably permit manu-
facturers to use their demonstrably well-informed and scientifically verifi-
able discretion to make the hard choices necessitated by the constraints
of space and user comprehension discussed above.
Finally, in cases where manufacturers choose not to avail themselves
of any pre-publication process, a procedural approach would require
courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption that the warning in question
was inadequate as a matter of law. This aspect of the approach would
serve four distinct purposes. First, it would spur manufacturers to em-
ploy useful procedural methodology and to extend its benefits to a larger
number of consumers, thus advancing the important goal of injury pre-
vention. Second, if manufacturers decide against using that methodol-
ogy, courts would then possess a more rational basis for imposing
liability on them: Having spurned valid procedures, manufacturers rea-
sonably can be made to face the failure-to-warn claim at their peril.
Third, a clearly articulated pro-plaintiff presumption in this class of cases
would sometimes make evident what courts now frequently attempt to
hide: Injured plaintiffs in warnings cases are a favored class. Making
this bias explicit, especially when there are good reasons for doing so,2'
would represent an act of judicial honesty that would enhance popular
respect for the system. Lastly, the use of this second presumption would
arguably permit courts to decide many cases more quickly than other-
wise, and thus would contribute significantly to the efficient administra-
tion of justice.
B. The Procedural Approach, Alternate Vocabularies, and the Question
of Relative Indeterminacy
In large measure, a procedural approach to warnings law is necessi-
tated by the problems of linguistic indeterminacy that plague existing
doctrine.245 In the course of addressing those problems, however, the
243. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 38-70 and accompanying text (discussing the linguistic indeterminacy
inherent in the obvious-danger rule); supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
linguistic indeterminacy inherent in the remote-danger rule).
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procedural approach raises three philosophically related questions about
the arguably inherent insufficiency of language, both in warnings law in
particular and in torts law in general.
One might concede, for example, that the present terminology of
warnings law is hopelessly indeterminate,246 and nevertheless argue that
the cause of that indeterminacy is not to be found in the existing substan-
tive approach, but rather stems from an historically "poor" choice of a
working vocabulary for elaborating that approach. Perhaps, in other
words, a "better," less subjective, vocabulary of risk would enable the
existing approach to yield more coherent results in warnings cases, and
would obviate the need for a major change in judicial methodology. Fur-
ther, one might admit that the deficiencies of its vocabulary doom the
substantive approach to produce an irrational and incoherent body of
law, but contend that shifting to a procedural methodology would ac-
complish little in the way of rationalizing warnings law, since the lan-
guage of the new approach could be no more determinate than that of the
old. Finally, while one might be willing to acknowledge that terms like
"obvious" and "adequate" cannot often be put to good use in warnings
law, one might caution against abandoning them, for fear of descending
the slippery slope; if we jettison those words, then must we not also dis-
card other elements of the torts lexicon, words like "reasonable" and
"necessary," for example, that must be equally devoid of articulable
meaning? And, having shed all of that vague terminology, will we find
anything left of the linguistic structure of tort law or will we have decon-
structed it into oblivion?
A yearning for a more determinate vocabulary lies at the heart of
the Reporters' Study's proposal that the federal government "create a
uniform national vocabulary.., respecting risk levels."24  But even if
such a vocabulary could be developed and communicated effectively-
tasks of no small order 2 4 -the problem of selecting which kinds of risks
merit description by the new vocabulary would remain the central ques-
tion of warnings law. As long as the courts answer that question by ref-
erence to the empty notions of "obvious" and "remote," resolution of
that problem will continue to be stalled in semantic gridlock.
Since the existing approach to failure-to-warn claims always starts,
and usually ends, by characterizing the hazard in question as either "ob-
vious," "remote," or "relevant," it offers no escape from the problems
inherent in defining undefinable terms. Courts laboring under the pre-
246. See supra notes 14-89 and accompanying text.
247. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 74.
248. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
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vailing methodology will continue to need terminology that limits the
manufacturer's warning obligation to some "reasonable" dimension, un-
less they are prepared instead to announce that manufacturers must warn
about all product risks of which they know.249 But since any language
intended to distinguish legally "relevant" risks from legally "irrelevant"
ones will inevitably recreate the subjectivity characteristic of the "obvi-
ous" and "remote" tandem, acute problems of indeterminacy seem una-
voidable in any substance-based approach to warnings law.
But if indeterminacy is bound to infect a warnings doctrine that fo-
cuses on substance, why, one might ask, would it not have the same
harmful impact on a process-based approach? Indeed, if all words are
equally indeterminate, there is no good answer to this question.250 Not
all words, however, seem to share the same degree of indeterminacy.
Compared to the words "obvious," "remote," and "adequate," the criti-
cal terminology of the procedural approach described above seems fixed
and objective. Expert testimony can define for a court the terms "focus
group" and "market research," for example, at least within bounds that
seem capable of reasoned expression and useful debate. Deciding
whether a manufacturer took the relevant procedural steps-yes or no-
is more or less verifiable, and infinitely easier than arriving at a broadly
applicable understanding of the key words of current doctrine. If, then,
determinacy is relative, and more determinacy is better than less, the pro-
cedural approach advocated in this Article is preferable on linguistic
grounds to the current terminology of warnings law.
One still might ask, even if determinacy is relative, and even if the
language of "scientific" procedures is arguably more objective than the
open-ended adjectives that form the core of the traditional vocabulary of
warnings law, how can we criticize words like "obvious" and "ade-
quate," without also calling into question terms such as "reasonable" and
"negligent," and thereby threatening to topple the entire semantic frame-
work of torts? One might suggest that it is preferable to indulge our-
selves in a philosophical fiction and profess to understand the meaning of
"obvious" and "adequate," closing our eyes to the fundamental problems
of warnings law, so that we also can continue pretending to understand
what "reasonable" means and forestall the need to challenge the rational-
ity of the bulk of torts law.
Such an elaborate fiction, however, and its attendant self-deception
249. As discussed earlier, supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text, such a rule would not
only be physically impossible for many manufacturers to satisfy, but would also present con-
sumers with problems of informational overload.
250. Nor, for that matter, will there be a good answer to any other question, since no
question will be capable of being either well understood or well answered.
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are unnecessary, because in this context, "reasonable" can indeed be dis-
tinguished from "adequate." A discussion of the many ways in which
torts law defines the term "reasonable" is well beyond the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to say that some notion of "reasonable" behavior, or of
the "reasonable" person, instructs the development of the duty concept
in a great many tort actions.251 What distinguishes those actions from
failure-to-warn claims, though, and what argues strongly for the exist-
ence of a functional distinction between "reasonable" and "adequate," is
that warnings cases are, unlike the others, neither local nor relational in
character. 252 The large majority involve national or regional manufac-
turers selling to people whom they have never met.
Most tort actions are arguably either local or relational, with de-
fendants falling into one of two categories. In the first category are those
defendants who were linked with the plaintiff, prior to the accident, in a
relationship, contractual or quasi-contractual, that gave rise to a duty of
care.25 3 In the second category are those who have allegedly failed to
251. That notion, first expressed as the concept of the prudent man, was adopted in
Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 472-75, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492-93 (1837), as the
standard for negligence. Id. Over time, it has been personified by a number of different char-
acters, e.g., "'the man in the street,' " or " 'the man who takes the magazines, at home and...
pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.'" Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1
K.B. 205, 224. It has remained the defining standard of conduct in negligence cases. See, e.g.,
KEETON et al., supra note 91, § 32, at 173-75.
252. Commentators have consistently recognized, for example, that the reasonable person
standard requires courts and juries to assess the defendant's conduct by defining "reasonable"
according to their community's understanding of what constitutes proper behavior. See, e.g.,
KEETON et al., supra note 91, § 32, at 173-75; Fleming James, Jr., Nature of Negligence, 3
UTAH L. REv. 275, 280 (1953); Fleming James, Jr., The Quality of the Reasonable Man in
Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1951); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable
Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410,
423-24 (1970) ("[W]e use a jury ... so that we may obtain the community's judgment of what
is proper... If we broaden the meaning of community to take in a wide area... we are back
to our average man.").
253. Many kinds of relationships give rise under the law to duties of care. A wide variety
of contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements such as those, for example, between bailor
and bailee, host and guest, owner and invitee, landlord and tenant, doctor and patient, or
lifeguard and swimmer, may create such duties. See generally RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A (1965) ("Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect"). Duties are
also created by certain "special" relationships, so-called because one party's superior knowl-
edge or voluntary undertaking is found to occasion toward the other a duty of care that would
not otherwise exist. See, eg., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 551
P.2d 334, 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1976) (finding that psychotherapist who determined that
his patient planned to kill a specific individual had a duty to protect the intended victim);
Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 941-44, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510-12 (1964)
(holding that sheriff, who had promised to inform plaintiff about the release from jail of a
prisoner who had threatened her, was negligent for having failed to do so). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965) (noting that "[t]he law appears to
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observe either express254 or implicit255 norms of local behavior. For pur-
poses of this discussion, these two categories of cases share two extremely
important characteristics. In each, the notion of reasonableness is con-
textually bounded, either by the terms or expectations of a relationship
formed in the community, or by community experience with the behav-
ior in question. The remedy in each is also local, involving either the
payment of damages and nothing more or the alteration of a behavior
whose scale was relatively confined.
Warnings law is different. A nominal relationship exists between
the maker of a product and its buyer, but because manufacturers cannot
know all of the people who use their products, rarely contract with them
directly, and never learn their specific informational needs, the relation-
ship lacks content.256  Indeed, warnings must be directed not just to
product buyers, but to product users as well, a much larger category of
potential plaintiffs, and one without even a nominal relationship to the
manufacturer. For most products, moreover, the drafting of a warning
label is a quintessentially national activity. Since almost all products are
portable and capable of being moved frequently from one locality to an-
be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of depen-
dence or mutual dependence).
254. The doctrine of negligence per se, for example, is predicated upon the defendant's
violation of a particular statute or local ordinance. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288B (1965) (addressing the effect of an unexcused violation of a legislative enact-
ment). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-80h (1990) (stating that failure to have brakes in
condition required by statute constitutes negligence per se); Hendrix v. Miller, 287 Ala. 486,
491, 252 So. 2d 640, 645 (1971) (holding that violation of local traffic ordinance is negligence
per se); Baker v. Mauldin, 82 N.C. App. 404, 406, 346 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1986) (stating that
operating vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants is negligence per se).
255. In many ways, the common-law action of nuisance is the paradigmatic local tort. A
private nuisance is defined generally as a substantial and unreasonable interference with one's
use and enjoyment of his land, see KEETON et al., supra note 91, § 87, at 619, while the con-
cept of public nuisance extends more broadly to almost any form of obstruction or inconven-
ience that burdens the use of common public rights. Ia § 86, at 618. Both doctrines, however,
rely in their application entirely upon individuated community notions of appropriate conduct.
For the application of community standards to private nuisances, see RESrATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 821D (1965) (citing Wade v. Miller, 188 Mass. 6, 7, 73 N.E. 849, 849 (Mass.
1905) (deciding that in this particular town, odors and noises of poultry were not offensive to
ordinary citizens and therefore not a nuisance)); and, as to public nuisance, see RE TATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1965) (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard.")); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 87-90 (1979).
256. Contrast this situation with the doctor-patient relationship, the only other instance
where the common law requires an affirmative and detailed exchange of information between
"more knowing" and "less knowing" parties. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Healers §§ 166-167 (1981). Doctors have intimate, first-hand experience with their patients,
the ability to speak with them directly in a controlled setting, and the opportunity to tailor
their message to the perceived needs of the patient.
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other, companies must draft one, and only one, warning for each of their
products. Unlike product design, marketing, and sales efforts, which can
often reflect local or regional factors, warning labels are inflexible, neces-
sarily saying the same thing to everyone in the country.
Because failure-to-warn cases are neither local nor relational, judges
and juries are ill-equipped institutionally to assess the content of particu-
lar warnings. Manufacturers cannot usefully speak to all local or rela-
tional needs, since they cannot, economically or safely, draft warnings
specially designed for each product user or each community. Nor can
courts or juries impose remedies that are local or relational in scope. By
compelling a change in the "local" label, a judgment that a particular
warning is "inadequate" inevitably forces a change in the "national" la-
bel as well, regardless of whether it is generally wise to effect such a
change. In other words, warnings cases unmoor local decision-makers
from the contexts in which questions of "reasonableness" can be usefully
answered, place them in the position of judging the "reasonableness" of
activity that cannot be taken with only them in mind, and enable-in-
deed, compel-them to engraft parochial solutions onto ecumenical
problems. Because it requires factfinders to make non-contextual deci-
sions about ambiguous terms, the language of warnings law is unwork-
able in a way that most of torts law is not.257 For this reason, changing
the analytic paradigm in warnings law will neither unravel the rest of
torts law nor force us to view "reasonableness" in make-believe fashion.
C. Some Current Analogies to the Process-Based Approach
If courts were to adopt the procedural approach described above,
failure-to-warn law would not be the first to consider or utilize a form of
process-based methodology. Not only do medical malpractice law and
administrative law employ distinctly procedural methodologies, but some
commentators have already advocated the use of a process-oriented anal-
ysis for certain other aspects of products liability law.
Consider first the area of medical malpractice. The liability inquiry
in that area focuses not on whether the defendant failed substantively to
improve the plaintiff's health, for example, but on whether she failed
257. In some sense, this discussion about the difference between warnings law and other
areas of torts law that employ a reasonableness standard is less about linguistic determinacy
and more about linguistic context. That is, the current approach to warnings law inevitably
requires the use of terms like "obvious" and "adequate" and asks juries to infuse them with
local, individualized definitions which are then employed to judge the legality of a national
endeavor usually aimed at the "average consumer." Under these circumstances, if the words
were switched-if warnings had to be "reasonable" and other behavior had to be "adequate,"
for example-"reasonable" would fail and "adequate" would succeed.
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procedurally, by neglecting to follow a scientifically valid treatment
methodology.258 Moreover, the procedural standard of care adopted by
most courts depends for its efficacy upon some notion of scientific valid-
ity whose elaboration is itself dependent upon expert testimony from
members of the defendant's profession.259
For many years, a physician's liability for alleged medical malprac-
tice has hinged not upon whether her patient suffered a substantively
"bad" outcome from a medical intervention, but upon whether the physi-
cian employed procedures and techniques that were scientifically "rea-
sonable" or "acceptable." 2" In the late 1950s, medical malpractice
doctrine regarded "compliance with accepted practice" '261 as the conclu-
sive benchmark of proper care and permitted evidence of local medical
custom, established through the testimony of local physicians,262 to de-
fine the scientific standard.263 Over the past thirty years, that narrow
standard has expanded dramatically and has evolved into a much
broader construct that considers a variety of approaches to be scientifi-
cally valid. 2 Admittedly, that evolution has resulted neither in judicial
258. See, eg., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
259. With a few minor exceptions, the standard of care in medical malpractice cases has
historically been provided by expert medical testimony. See Allan H. MeCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 560 (1959); Jon R. Waltz, The Rise
and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv.
408, 409 (1969).
260. See, eg., Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 165; Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600 S.W.2d
844, 847 (rex. Civ. App. 1980); see also PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 139-40 (1985) (discussing the use by courts of
custom to define the standard of care owed by medical professionals); Mark F. Grady, Why
Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Ex-
plosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 317 (1988) ("[Most courts still hold doctors liable only when
they fail to use techniques and procedures customary among their peers in similar
situations.").
261. See McCoid, supra note 259, at 558.
262. Both aspects of the so-called "locality rule"-that local procedures, as described by
local doctors, formed the legal standard-have been almost completely eroded by recent case
law. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 276 Md. 187, 199, 349 A.2d 245, 252
(1975); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871-72 (Miss. 1985); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.
2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967).
263. See McCoid, supra note 259, at 605-09 (discussing customary practice as "almost ex-
clusively, the measure of due care"); see also Waltz, supra note 259, at 410-11 (describing the
early form of the locality rule that required testimony from an expert who came from the same
town as the defendant).
264. There are at least four different, acceptable standards. Where scientific authority is
divided about the wisdom of a particular procedure, the "respectable minority" standard per-
mits a physician to follow a method of treatment advocated by a "considerable number" of
physicians in his or her area of practice. McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 400 (M.D. Pa.
1947); see also Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that it is not
malpractice to be among the minority in a given city who follow one of the accepted schools
where two or more schools of thought exist among competent medical professionals); Leech v.
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unanimity about the correct methodology, nor in outpourings of aca-
demic praise for the coherence of medical malpractice law. Nevertheless,
it has proven the vitality and adaptability of an approach that looks less
to the substantive character of the alleged wrong and more to its proce-
dural aspects. Thus, despite suggestions that the entire fault-based sys-
tem of medical malpractice be scrapped in favor of a regime of strict
liability,26 the existing procedural approach endures, suggesting at least
that an analogous approach to warnings claims might also survive.
Not only has medical malpractice law made arguably good use of a
procedurally-focused inquiry, it has done so despite the seeming difficul-
ties of defining scientifically acceptable procedures and of relying for
those definitions upon the expert testimony of members of the defend-
ants' profession. Different courts have arrived at differing notions of
"valid" procedure,266 but without creating the kind of critical uproar re-
cently aimed at failure-to-warn doctrine. Thus, while commentators de-
cry the "acute... problem of partisan experts" '267 in malpractice cases,
Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Ariz. 1967) (finding that a doctor committed malpractice
because of deviations from the accepted method of treatment as practiced by a respectable
minority of physicians within the United States). The "reasonable and prudent doctor" stan-
dard holds physicians to the practice methods that would have been used by a reasonable and
prudent doctor acting under similar circumstances. See Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 165. Some
courts allow for different courses of treatment, where reasonable doctors would disagree, see
Graham v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953), while
others prohibit "any variance" from the "accepted" mode of treatment, see Jackson v. Burn-
ham, 20 Colo. 532, 539-40, 39 P. 577, 580 (1895); Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 21-22, 89 N.W.
924, 931 (1902).
Some academic commentators have argued that the scientific inquiry should ask not
whether a particular procedure is in fact followed by some number of physicians, but whether
it is "acceptable" to the profession at large. See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard
of Care for the Medical Profession: The Accepted Practice Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213
(1975).
265. In 1967, Justice Tobriner, concurring in Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d
525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967), recommended to his colleagues on the California Supreme
Court that they adopt a rule of strict liability for the unexpected adverse results of medical
treatment, a recommendation that fell on deaf ears, and that has yet to find a receptive judicial
audience. Id. at 420-21, 426 P.2d at 535, 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 140 (Tobriner, J., concur-
ring); see also Michael M. Greenfleld, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied
Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 679 (1974) (proposing the
extension of strict liability in tort to cover service transactions); Robert E. Keeton, Compensa-
tion for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 613-17 (1973) (concluding that a shift
from a fault to a nonfault basis would lead to substantially higher overall costs with only a
slight improvement in efficiency); Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical
Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142-43 (1975) (comparing the economic efficiency of
medical malpractice liability systems); see also Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super.
529, 535, 295 A.2d 363, 366 (1972) (rejecting strict liability approach); Hoven v. Kelble, 79
Wis. 2d 444, 469-72, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391-93 (1977) (same).
266. See cases discussed supra note 264.
267. CLARK HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 778 (1988); see also Richard
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even proposals to modify the system do no more than suggest the in-
creased use of impartial medical expertise.2 16 At least in this context, the
courts have largely resolved the problem of determining "scientific valid-
ity," a fact that bodes well for the success of a procedural approach in the
failure-to-warn area.
Consider next the example of administrative law. Over the past
twenty-five years, a combination of complicated new federal statutes
aimed at protecting the environment and Reagan-era deregulation has
engendered a revolutionary shift in the premises underlying judicial re-
view of agency action.269  Appellate courts that had traditionally de-
ferred to agency rulemaking began, in the 1970s and 80s, to drop their
deferential ways and to engage instead in what has come to be called
"hard-look review."27 0 This form of review generally requires appellate
judges to be more demanding in their scrutiny of agency action and to
make more probing inquiries into the factual determinations and proce-
dural steps that formed the predicate for that action.27"
Shortly after the initial articulation of "hard-look review," a schism
developed between two of its principal proponents, Judges Leventhal and
Bazelon of the United States Court. of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. Judge Leventhal insisted that courts must familiarize themselves
with the factual underpinnings of agency action, no matter how compli-
L. Saunders, We Can Close Down the "Hired Gun" Industry, MED. ECON., June 8, 1987, at 28
(proposing that academic medical centers screen maipratice claims for plaintiffs and defend-
ants). See generally IAN R. FRECKELTON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT 3-13 (1987) (critiquing
generally the use of experts in the legal system).
268. See FED R. EVID. 706 (authorizing the courts to appoint impartial experts, whose
costs would be chargeable to the parties).
269. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 505,
509-10 (1985); James T. O'Reilly, Judicial Review of Agency Deregulation: Alternatives and
Problems for the Courts, 37 VAND. L. REv. 509, 510-12 (1984); William F. Pedersen, Jr.,
Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 58-60 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177, 179; Peter H.A. Lehner,
Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 627, 634-35 (1983).
270. One court has described "hard look" review as requiring a standard of appellate eval-
uation designed to test whether the agency in question has reasonably considered all of the
material facts and issues; whether it has, in other words, taken a hard look at those issues; and
whether it has articulated the basis of its decision with reasonable clarity, identifying those
facts thought to be significant or crucial to its decision. Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). For two other
cases that outline the history and rationale of this development, see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 33-36 (D.C.Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
271. For a general description of "hard-look review," see STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICH-
ARD B. STEVART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, PROBLEMS, TEXT,
AND CASES 342 (2d ed. 1985); WALTER GELLHORN et al., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES
AND COMMENTS 475-503 (8th ed. 1987).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cated those facts might be, because it was only through such familiarity
that they could secure rational agency outcomes.272 Judge Bazelon, by
contrast, cautioned against a deeply substantive form of review, arguing
that judges lacked the technical expertise necessary for engaging in the
detailed examination of complicated scientific matters, and advocated in-
stead an appellate stance intended to assure that the agency had carefully
followed an appropriate set of procedures.273
The Leventhal-Bazelon debate about the appropriate scope of
"hard-look review" has proved a natural stimulant to academic discus-
sion of the topic. While some commentators have argued for an ex-
panded, substantive inquiry into the wisdom of regulatory decisions, 274
others have called for an approach that emphasizes process and avoids
extensive content-based examinations into matters within the agency's
area of expertise.275
Although the dispute over the proper standard of review in adminis-
trative law is not settled, by now its arguments have been well rehearsed.
The "Leventhal" school contends that, either because of capture, inepti-
tude, or particular political agendas, agencies often make substantively
incorrect decisions, and that only aggressive courts, willing to examine in
depth the substance of those decisions, can spare us their untoward con-
sequences.276 The "Bazelon" school, by contrast, questions the expertise,
political propriety, and efficiency of a substantive approach to judicial
review and argues that while courts are quite competent to resolve issues
of procedure, their institutional competence stops where questions of
substantive expertise begin.277
The procedural approach outlined in this Article reflects the same
kind of discomfort with traditional decision-making processes that in-
forms the debate about the proper scope of judicial review of agency de-
terminations. Indeed, the process-based approach described above
shares some of the same shortcomings attributed to the Bazelon school of
"hard-look review." Like that standard, a procedural approach to warn-
272. See, for example, the opinions of Judge Leventhal in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
68-69 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Portland Ce-
ment Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 377-402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974); and International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 622-50 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
273. See, for example, the opinion of Judge Bazelon in Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 66,
274. David Sive, Some Thoughts ofAn Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness ofAdmin-
istrative Law, 70 COLuM. L. RV. 612, 629 (1970).
275. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 537-40 (1974).
276. Sive, supra note 274, at 650-51.
277. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 66 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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ings law is vulnerable to the criticism that it may result in incorrect or
unfair decisions, may fail to afford sufficient protection to consumers,
and may leave serious injury uncompensated. But it also contains the
virtues of that approach. Courts are asked to do what they do best: eval-
uate procedural fairness. Technical expertise is encouraged and given its
due. A judicial focus on method is used to shape outcomes that not only
are broadly beneficial to consumers, but are also fair to other participants
in the process and capable of reasoned explanation by the courts.
Finally, the approach advanced in this article has an historical ante-
cedent much closer to home. Twelve years ago, Professor Twerski and
three colleagues proposed that defendants in design defect litigation have
at their disposal a process defense.27 Specifically, they suggested that
"[ilf a manufacturer defends an action by revealing a well-documented
safety review process, the court should presume that the product is not
defective." '279 Ironically, in light of Professor Twerski's more recent en-
dorsement of heightened attention to agency rules regarding warnings, 280
his process thesis for design cases stemmed in part from a multi-faceted
distrust of the competence of federal agencies. 81 Curiously, from the
perspective of failure-to-warn law, he explicitly rejected the idea that his
procedural approach could be applied with equal efficacy to issues of
warning label adequacy. 282
Twerski and his co-authors failed to recognize the havoc wreaked on
warnings law by the irresolvable ambiguity of its critical terms, a failing
that seriously distorted their view of warnings issues. By realizing, how-
278. Aaron D. Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to
Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 347, 358 (1980).
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 186-97 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing Professor
Twerski's proposal).
281. Twerski et al., supra note 278, at 352-55. Equally ironic, perhaps, is the fact that
Professor Twerski's proposal drew its first significant critique from none other than Professor
Henderson, his current collaborator. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Should A "Process De-
fense" Be Recognized in Product Design Cases?, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 585 (1981).
282. Twerski et al., supra note 278, at 381. The reasons for that rejection are not made
perfectly clear, nor do they seem correct, even on their own terms. Thus, the authors argue
that "the failure-to-warn problem is less polycentric and less amenable to the argument that
good faith trade-offs made by the manufacturer in close-call cases should not be a predicate of
liability if the process has met the suggested standards." Id. In other words, the various
elements of an "adequate" warning lack the same high degree of interrelatedness possessed by
the elements of product design. For reasons expressed earlier, this author disagrees with that
conclusion, to the extent that it implies that judging the adequacy of warning labels does not
present courts with intractable problems of polycentricity. See discussion supra note 140. To
the extent that it purports to measure relative degrees of polycentricity, this author does not
understand it. And to the extent that it ignores the problems of linguistic indeterminacy that
completely frustrate doctrinal coherence, this author is critical of it.
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ever, that a process-based approach could rationalize the law of design
defects, they broke important theoretical ground. The idea of a proce-
dural approach is thus no longer new to products liability law. On Twer-
ski's terms, "correctly" applied, process-based methodology makes good
sense for warnings law. On this author's terms, procedural analysis is its
last hope.283
D. Is Strict Liability a Viable Alternative?
Simply because the existing content-based approach to warnings law
cannot work, a process-based technique may not be the best alternative.
A procedural methodology, after all, would attempt to correct some of
the pro-plaintiff biases found in the current system and would give it a
decidedly pro-defendant cast. Why not, some might argue, turn the sys-
tem more forcefully in the other direction, admit that it has become es-
sentially a vehicle for plaintiff compensation, and transform it into a
regime of strict liability?
Indeed, on the most general of levels, a scheme of strict liability for
warning-related injuries might seem to respond directly to many of the
systemic problems of the current approach. In place of the prevailing
confusion, a rule of strict liability would substitute a new certainty.
Warnings law would be driven by the goal of plaintiff compensation.284
Deterrence would be provided by an intimidating regime of liability with-
out fault. Finally, the costs to the manufacturer of this new regime, the
costs of drafting "perfect" warnings and of insuring against the conse-
quences of imperfect ones, would be internalized and passed on equitably
to all product users, much in the manner of strict liability for product
283. There is no denying the breadth and intelligence of Professor Twerski's work in prod-
ucts liability law generally, or in the failure-to-warn area in particular. In addition to the 1980
article under discussion, see Obvious Danger Warnings, supra note 32; Doctrinal Collapse,
supra note 13; ALVIN S. WEINSTEIN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY
SAFE PRODUCT (1978); Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 11. But his scholarly peregri-
nations around some of the more difficult issues in warnings law symbolize the intractability
and futility of current doctrine. Thus, in his "process" article in 1980, Twerski was a staunch
foe of the administrative process, see Twerski et al., supra note 278, at 352-55, but today he
champions its increased use. See Doctrinal Collapse, supra note 13, at 320. In that same 1980
piece, Twerski and his co-authors found the problems of product warnings "less polycentric"
than those of product design, id. at 381, although just four years earlier they had concluded
that a warnings case is "every bit as complex and can involve the same elements of polycentric-
ity" as a classic design case. See Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 11, at 525.
284. A number of scholars enthusiastically endorse plaintiff compensation as the overriding
goal of torts law in general, and of products liability law in particular. See, e.g., Richard L.
Abel, Review: £s of Cure, Ounces of Prevention, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1004-05 (1985); W.
Page Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REV. 398, 401
(1970); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 591-96
(1985).
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defects.285
Whatever the seeming merits of a proposal for a rule of strict liabil-
ity, however, the practical implications of such a rule argue overwhelm-
ingly against it. Three separate kinds of "strict" regimes seem possible.
The first, which would impose liability upon a manufacturer for all prod-
uct-related injuries, regardless of its fault, would totally reshape all the
components of current products law and completely remove from the
liability calculus any consideration of the manufacturer's conduct or the
user's responsibility. As a response to the dilemmas of warnings law, it
seems far too extreme.
The second, a Beshada-like approach,286 would oblige manufactur-
ers to provide consumers with "adequate" warnings about all "relevant"
product risks, even those that were unknowable at the time that the
product was marketed. The "strictness" of this type of methodology,
however, has been widely criticized as irrational, since it not only pun-
ishes manufacturers for failing to perform the impossible, but also skews
their incentives to engage in an efficient amount of safety research and
either severely disrupts or totally eliminates a significant portion of the
insurance market for products liability.2 7 Offered and rejected, this ver-
sion of strict liability is an idea whose time has passed.
The third, and more moderate, regime would be a rough analogue of
the existing rule for manufacturing defects. Under that rule, a plaintiff
seeking recovery for an injury allegedly caused by a product defect must
show only that the product was in fact defective when placed on the
market, and that the defect actually caused his injury.2 18 He need not
prove that the defect resulted from the defendant's negligence. A strict
approach for warnings might provide, in parallel fashion, that when a
plaintiff's injuries are brought about by a defect in the defendant's warn-
285. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463-64 (1985).
286. For a discussion of Beshada and its progeny, see supra note 87.
287. See Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 930, 933 (1983); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-39
(1987); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 824-28 (1983); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Un-
fortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892, 901-05 (1983);
John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Market-
ing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 757-61 (1983); Robert D. Casale, Comment, Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 1006-07
(1983); William R. Murray, Jr., Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Sci-
entifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 GEo. L.J. 1635, 1637 (1983).
288. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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ing label,2 89 the plaintiff can recover without having to demonstrate neg-
ligence in the preparation of the warning.
Once this hypothetical rule of strict liability is articulated, however,
it becomes apparent that it precisely describes the present state of affairs
in warnings law. Indeed, a number of courts have expressly remarked
upon the almost perfect similarity between the negligence and strict lia-
bility approaches to warnings claims.2 90 If anything, because of its re-
laxed view of causation, existing failure-to-warn law may be even more
"strict" than the theoretical model. This means either that a conscious
shift to an explicit rule of strict liability would be redundant, because
prevailing methodology is sufficiently strict, or that the institution of a
strict liability approach would solve none of the mysteries of current
warnings law, since it would still require courts to engage in the same
futile and anarchical search for "defect"--whether the "relevant" risk
was enumerated and whether the warning label otherwise was "ade-
quate"-that lies at the root of existing doctrinal ills.
Moreover, one of the rationales traditionally invoked in support of
strict liability is the compulsion that it exerts on manufacturers to redress
contractually irremediable imbalances of information. 291 By concentrat-
ing on the process by which the manufacturer gathers and uses risk infor-
mation, the procedural approach advocated in this Article undertakes,
first, to persuade manufacturers to employ rational and scientific meth-
ods for amassing risk information and, ultimately, to permit them to jus-
289. A "defective label," for this purpose, would be one that failed to alert the consumer to
a relevant risk of injury that was scientifically knowable to the manufacturer at the time that
its product was marketed.
The issue of what degree of scientific knowledge must exist in order to invoke the duty to
warn, which is beyond the scope of this article, is itself a fascinating topic. For example, in
Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984), the
California Supreme Court suggested that a legal test that focused on scientific "knowledge"
was misdirected, since "knowledge," in the sense of absolute certainty, might never exist as to
particular risks. Id at 701, 677 P.2d at 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Because the causal link
established by science "may range from extremely vague to highly certain," courts should
attempt to define the duty to warn by describing the strength of the scientifically sufficient
causal connection. Id. at 699-701, 677 P.2d at 1152-53; 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874-876. Whether
knowledge, in the relevant sense, is a quantitative term (10, 15, 20 studies, for example) or a
qualitative one (one article in the "best" journal) is an open question.
290. See, eg., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 377, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618 (1982)
("Where the theory of liability is failure to warn or adequately instruct, negligence and strict
products liability are equivalent causes of action.") (citations omitted); see also Werner v.
Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting "close similarity" between negli-
gence and strict liability in warnings cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Basko v. Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that the two theories are virtually
identical).
291. See, eg., William M. Landes & Richard Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Prod-
ucts Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 555-59 (1985).
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tify their actions by relying on procedures designed to meet the
informational needs of their consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trade-offs are clear. While current doctrine offers more con-
sumer recovery after the fact, it provides little injury prevention before-
hand. While it affords judges and juries greater discretion in dealing with
ever-varying factual patterns, it furnishes them with no real standards or
meaningful criteria to apply to those patterns. While it permits at least
the piecemeal alteration of warning labels that have failed to alert con-
sumers to relevant risks of product use, it places manufacturers in a
hopeless quandary over how to satisfy a warning requirement the con-
tours of which have not and cannot be revealed.
Failure-to-warn law needs a major overhaul. It is a doctrinal body
with almost no working parts. The procedural approach outlined in this
article will not cure all of the problems in the law, but it will ameliorate
the major ones, while at the same time advancing the interests of con-
sumers in injury prevention, the interests of manufacturers in judicial
guidance and predictability, and the interests of courts in rational, coher-
ent, and efficient jurisprudence.
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